

The Month in Review

THE LONG-DELAYED Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' (Communist) Party finally took place during the Christmas Season. The regime's top leaders all delivered lengthy speeches in which they reviewed past accomplishments and outlined future tasks. Though the Congress brought few surprises—the composition of the top leadership, for instance, remained substantially the same—the mass of statistical detail released and the considerable comment made on all sectors of national life gave a clearer picture of present conditions within the country.



Politically, there were many indications of Party failure to unite its various factions into an effective instrument of leadership. Both the substance and tone of many harangues smacked of uncertainty and indicated that the Party had not yet recovered from the many purges that have marked its turbulent history. Membership has shrunk and workers still constitute a minority in their "own" Party; Party training, orientation and agitation have proved to be ineffective; the Party has failed to accomplish set tasks in all "mass" organizations; and it is now more isolated from the rest of the people than ever before.

Economically, successes have been scored in some sectors of industry, particularly in heavy industry, and future plans indicate that the Second Five Year Plan, like the First, will substantially increase capital goods industries, again at the expense of the people's living standard. There are signs, however, that the regime will be running into major difficulties in the next few years unless it finds a way to remedy the present slump in labor productivity. Plans in this sector have gone awry, indicating that the Party has not been able to institute the various types of industrial speedup essential to Communist economies. Another major setback was suffered in agriculture, and collectivization goals in the Second Plan are not much higher than those set for the First. By 1960, a preponderance of the arable land is supposed to be collectivized, but it appears that the regime will attempt to reach this target without using terror or impairing production. Its present method is to lure farmers "voluntarily" into the simplest forms of collective farming.

The Congress showed greater ideological rigidity than is now current in most countries in the area. In education and culture, for instance, the line laid down was essentially Stalinist, with stress on "Socialist content," discipline and unswerving adherence to Party edicts. But, if in many respects the Romanian course differs from that of its neighbors, economic cooperation with them is scheduled to increase and many aspects of the new Plan reflect the new trend towards greater intra-bloc integration.

In Hungary, the regime tried to put a halt to deviations from "Socialist content" in art and blasted "rightist trends" in literature. A Central Committee resolution bitterly condemned contemporary writing and deplored what it described as an "organized, anti-Party demonstration" at a November meeting of the Writers' Union. This demonstration, conducted by a group of well-known Communist authors, was directed against Party control

of literature and suppression of literary freedom. The regime claimed that the roots of the rebellion were political rather than literary, and accused the writers involved of making scathing remarks about living conditions in the country. It also accused them of having "petty-bourgeois" ideals and of acting in direct contradiction to Party policy.

The Romanian regime followed the lead of other countries in the area and established a repatriation committee to encourage exiles to return home. The new members of the committee include Gheorghe Tatarescu, prewar Liberal Premier, and Ionel Pop, former official in the Peasant Party. Several days after the committee had been formed and had announced its intention to "combat the influences of hostile propaganda," the nation's leading Socialist, Titel Petrescu, seconded the other former leaders of opposition parties in the campaign. In a letter to *Scinteia*, Petrescu (recently released from prison) voiced his support of the regime, praised Communist achievements, commended present-day life in Romania, and urged his fellow Socialists abroad to return home.

In Czechoslovakia, there were continued signs of a qualitative change in the nation's relationship to the USSR. Spokesmen from both countries emphasized the importance of a "mutual exchange" of experience, indicating that the exchange until now has been too one-sided. The Communists paid particular attention to Czechoslovak economic experience, and Radio Prague declared that there were many things Czechoslovakia could do as well as the USSR. The broadcast also pointed out that Soviet techniques should not be adopted uncritically and that exaggerated admiration for the USSR was not beneficial to Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship.

The Bulgarian regime continued its "friendship" campaign in the Balkans, renewing efforts to improve relations with Greece. In a New Years' message, Premier Chervenkov voiced Bulgaria's readiness to settle part of the reparations debt with Greece and emphasized the "common interests" uniting the two countries. He also stated that Bulgaria had no desire to impose its system on any other nation and that it wanted to live in an "atmosphere of mutual confidence."

In the early part of December, Czechoslovak Premier Siroky delivered a speech on 1955 plan fulfillment. The Premier claimed that in 1955 industrial production had developed at a much faster rate than in 1954 and that the government's policy of "not interrupting the growth of industrial production" had been correct. Siroky insisted on the need for "proportionate development" of the economy, but he emphasized that "disproportions" would be eliminated on the "march forward." In a speech several days later, Otakar Simunek also discussed 1955 results. Although gains had been made, he said, plan targets in capital investment, engineering and hard coal mining were unfulfilled.

In Poland, First Deputy Premier Hilary Minc spoke on the overall results of the Six Year Plan. He said that while the plan in industry was generally overfulfilled, the plan for agriculture had fallen far short of scheduled targets. Minc blamed this on unrealistic goals, too high a rate of planned collectivization, and inadequate mechanization. He also indicated that more economic incentives, a better tax and delivery system, and "curbs on violations of legality" would have resulted in better farm production.

Romanian Party and Congress

I. Short History of the Romanian Communist Party*

THE ORIGIN of the Romanian labor movement can be traced as far back as 1835, when followers of Charles Fourier set up the first phalanstery at Scaeni. The turning point in this early development came with the arrival from Russia in 1875 of Nathan Katz (Dobrogeanu-Gherea) who eliminated from these Socialist "clubs" the then dominant Bakunin-nihilist orientation and brought them under the influence of the so-called "reformists"—Bernstein, Kautsky, Lasalle and others. The Romanian Social-Democratic Party was then created in 1893 as a result of the fusion of various intellectual clubs and professional labor organizations. The program of the new party was patterned on the 1891 "Erfurt Program" of the Second International and its platform clearly specified that "The party directs its activity in a legal way, this being the only way to contribute fruitfully to the Socialist movement."

In the years preceding the first World War the new party sought to consolidate its organizational strength and was moderately successful in this endeavor. The Socialist movement however was rent by deep dissensions and these divergences came to the fore after the October Revolution in Russia. Three main forces crystallized: 1. the Reformists, a majority in the Social-Democratic movement, who remained in the Second International; 2. the Centrists, who though they sought to steer the movement to the left of the Second International, refused to join the Third Inter-

* This section is based on a study by the Free Europe Press Planning and Analysis division of the Free Europe Committee. Both private and official regime sources were used. Communist sources include: *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Oct. 20, 1945; Dec. 31, 1947; May 11, 1951; Sept. 13, 1952; June 3, 1952; Aug. 23, 1953; Aug. 8, 1954; Aug. 23, 1954; *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* (Bucharest), Apr. 7, 1950; May 1, 1949; Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej—*Articole si cuvantari*—Third Edition, Editura pentru Literatura Politica (Bucharest), 1952.

FORMER DEPUTY



Former Exploiter—Now that everybody votes, I can't be elected; before, when nobody voted for me I was always elected.

—By Nell Cobar.

Romanian News (Washington), January 21, 1951

national; 3. the Maximalists (a tiny minority) who were the forerunners of the Romanian Communist Party and sought immediate affiliation with the Third International.

Wishing to put an end to the intra-party strife, Social-Democratic leaders sent a delegation to Moscow in September 1920 to study conditions in the Soviet Union. This delegation contained members of all three factions; it consisted of Constantin Popovici, Gheorghe Cristescu, Alexander Dobrogeanu, F. Fabian, and Ion Flueraș. All of these men, with the exception of Flueraș, were won over to the Third International.

While this mission was in the USSR, a general strike broke out in Romania. The Social-Democratic labor leaders were jailed and trade-union and party offices were occupied by the Army. The Maximalists, who returned from Moscow, decided to act quickly to take advantage of the temporary removal of their rivals. They therefore set up a "General Council," which met in February 1921, accepted in principle affiliation with the Third International and summoned a Congress for May to "legalize" the decision. This Congress was to meet before the expected release from prison of the majority leadership, but government agents, privy to the Congress' purpose, entered the building on the second day and arrested all 70 delegates who had cast their votes for affiliation with the Comintern. The remnants of

the Maximalist faction then summoned another Congress which met in Ploesti in 1922. The Communist Party of Romania was born at this meeting: statutes were drawn up, a youth group was formed, and the political program of the new organization formulated.

The new Party set out to gain the initiative by reactivating the trade unions, which had been broken up after the October 1920 general strike. With this in mind a trade union conference was called at Sibiu in 1922, but few unionists responded and the newly-formed Communist-directed federal trade union group failed to attract the majority of organized workers. The Party then tried to infiltrate the Social-Democratic movement and, on January 23, 1923, announced the formation of a so-called "Unified Trade-Union Committee" which was supposed to consist of three Communist Party members, three Social Democrats and three representatives from the unions. The Social Democrats flatly refused to cooperate, organized instead their own trade-union group (affiliating it to the International Trade Union Federation in Amsterdam), and voted to expel Communists from membership or leadership in the trade unions.

Thrown back on their own resources, the Communists once again tried to form a labor organization exclusively under their control, this time the "Unified Trade Union." They were again rebuffed by the rank and file, and membership never expanded sufficiently to be in real competition with the Social-Democratic Unions. Blocked on the labor front, the Party, on directions from Moscow, then turned its attention to Bessarabia where, during 1924, there were frequent and sharp peasant disturbances because of discontent over land distribution. The Communists tried to capitalize on the situation by attributing this ferment to their own activities and support. Meanwhile the Comintern attempted to persuade the Party to agitate for restoration of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, thus causing a schism in Party ranks and the outlawing of the Party by the Romanian Government. This necessitated calling a clandestine Third Congress in September 1924, its main purpose to patch up differences within the leadership.

Third, Fourth and Fifth Congresses

Only 57 delegates attended the Third Congress. One of their first moves was to expel the "right-wing opportunists" who had opposed agitation for ceding Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and to oust "individualists and intellectuals" who still looked for leadership to the West and the Socialist parties. Support was given to the resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern and to the "Leninist line, as defended by Comrade Stalin." It was also resolved to form Party cells in factories, and to formulate directives on labor and peasant questions. This Congress failed to eliminate the intense factionalism, and the Party therefore remained almost totally inactive for the next four years.

The Fourth Congress was called in 1928 to reunify the leadership of the ineffective underground organization. The resolutions presented were therefore as non-controversial as possible. Once again, however, disunity was ripe in the Party ranks, thus hampering implementation of an action

program. In 1930, the political secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern issued an order to the CPR to put an end to its factional squabbles. This time the Party's Central Committee was at least partially successful in that it managed to create a front group, the Worker-Peasant Bloc (*Blocul Muncitoresc si Taranesc*) which ran in the 1931 national elections but polled only 73,716 votes out of a total of 2,927,112 votes cast (*Monitorul Oficial*, III, [Bucharest], June 25, 1931). On August 15, 1931, the Central Committee also put out the first issue of *Scanteia*, the Party journal.

In the meantime a young worker, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who had joined the Party in 1929, led a cell which began to agitate aggressively among railway workers in the Grivita yards near Bucharest. This was fertile ground since, as civil servants, railway workers were not permitted to unionize. The first strike was called at the end of January 1931. Several leaders were arrested and the Party adopted a more careful attitude for a while, fully recognizing, however, the importance of railroad workers as a potential striking force in a major showdown. The Central Committee consequently encouraged Gheorghiu-Dej to lay the ground for further efforts.

The Fifth Congress, which was to be separated from the following Congress by a lapse of sixteen years, met in January 1932. It appears that the Secretariat was led by Marcel Pauker, who a few years later in Moscow was shot together with Al. Gherea, Bela Kun and others. Pauker's wife, Ana, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu and Lucretiu Patrascanu were some of the other Party leaders at that time.

The Party line, as laid down at the Congress, condemned both "right and left deviationists" and reaffirmed the need to overthrow the Government by force. Through other resolutions the Congress stressed once again the Party's distrust of and opposition to Socialist theories of peaceful evolution. The Congress re-stated the familiar stand against an "imperialist anti-Soviet" war and therefore sharply condemned all war preparations. Also on the agenda was a program of preparation for improved work among the peasants.

A year after the Congress, in January 1933, Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica and Ilie Pintilie organized a strike among the railway workers. The strike was violent and many were killed or wounded; the leaders were arrested, tried and sentenced to long prison terms in June 1933. Concurrently, the Party also organized "indirect" actions—through front groups which were designed to gain popular sympathy without appearing to embrace Communism. Finally, the Party also busied itself with stirring up minorities, achieving some notable success with the Hungarian minority. The Party failed, however, to persuade Social Democrats to form a "Popular Front" in 1936.

That year, the Government succeeded in tracking down and arresting Ana Pauker and other top and upcoming Communist leaders, including Teohari Georgescu, Vasile Luca, Alexandru Draghici and Alexandru Moghioros. Like the Dimitrov trial in Leipzig, the Ana Pauker trial was internationally publicized by the Comintern. Despite Patrascanu's efforts as counsel for the defense, all the leaders were

given long prison sentences and, since they formed the backbone of the Party, the verdicts put an end to effective Party activity.

Meanwhile the Spanish Civil War had broken out and, according to Party history books, some 500 workers joined the International Brigade. Party leaders still at large inside the country showed a conspicuous reluctance to take part in the fight. In these years immediately preceding World War II, the Party was not only ineffective but some of its members drifted toward other extremist groups, particularly the "Iron Guard," a Nazi-type organization. In 1938, when King Carol issued his edict banning all political activity (the Communist Party itself had been banned in 1924 and in 1934 G. Tatarescu of the National Liberal Party ordered dissolution of all Communist front organizations), the Party, far from protesting, actually ordered its members to join the National Renaissance Front, the political body established by King Carol to buttress his dictatorship. Years later, Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that the Party had erred, that it had backed the wrong group.* The Party thus failed to attack the Iron Guard in 1937 because it underestimated the strength of this fascist group and, when it did finally recognize the danger, concentrated its fire exclusively on the Iron Guard, while losing sight of the Royal dictatorship.

The War Years

In the early years of the war, the Party's stand was one of deliberate inactivity. The Communists naturally did not protest when, on June 26, 1940, the Romanian Government received a Soviet ultimatum to evacuate Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in three days. Nor did the Communists stir when, as a result of the Soviet-Nazi pact, the country's frontiers crumbled; they also remained "neutral" when the dictatorship of General Antonescu was established in 1940.

In this period of internal "neutrality" and an external amity between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, the Party benefited by having Ana Pauker freed from prison and exchanged by the Romanian dictator for a minor national figure caught by the Soviets in Bessarabia on the occasion of the Soviet "liberation." Ana Pauker was joined in Moscow by Luca (who with her had represented the Romanian Communist Party in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and was released from jail at that time) and by Emil Bodnaras, who had escaped. The Soviets also sought to have Gheorghiu-Dej exchanged, but Antonescu refused.

Before the war broke out between the USSR and Romania on June 22, 1941, the Government rounded up the other Communist leaders, including Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chisinevski, Teohari Georgescu, Vasile Vaida and Constanta Craciun. Patrascanu, who was deemed less dangerous, was kept under house arrest.

The Communist Party reacted very slowly to the new development. Its first move was a proposal made at the

* The admission was made at the National Conference of the CPR in 1945. Later—in *Articole si cuvantari* (Bucharest), 1951, Dej admitted that "This series of mistakes was made possible because of the superficial theoretical training of the leadership and low theoretical and political level of the Party in general. . . ."

Bright Future For Tomorrow's Citizens



Mme. Ana Pauker, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vasile Luca, Finance Minister, and Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior at the inauguration of the Palace of Pioneers, in Bucharest.

Photo and heading were in an article in *Romanian News* (Washington), August 20, 1950. These were the then leaders of the Party; their own "bright future" ended in a purge.

beginning of September 1941 to the other parties to form a united front against Antonescu and to stop the war against the Soviet Union. The offer was rejected by the democratic parties. In later stages of the war, after the Romanian army had suffered its heavy losses in the Crimea and at Stalingrad, the Party became more active. Late in 1943 or early the following year, Emil Bodnaras was slipped over the front lines into Romanian territory and given the command of the so-called partisans, who, if they existed at all, were minor bands which accomplished very little. At one time, however, a group of 17 saboteurs were parachuted into Romania from the USSR with the mission of sabotaging oil transports on the railroads north of Ploesti. They were not very successful in their mission, and were captured and shot.

As soon as the Soviet-trained leaders entered the country they purged a large part of the Party leadership—leaders like Foris and Kofler, who had led Romanian Communists from 1936 until then. The liquidation seems to have reflected Moscow's displeasure with policies in the years preceding the war, particularly the failure to oppose the Iron Guard, the alliance with King Carol and later, the inability to mobilize resistance. The purge no doubt also stemmed from Moscow's distrust of leaders who for years had been acting outside of its direct control.

If the Communists thus accomplished little behind the

lines from the military point of view, they were not totally inactive, particularly politically. Their instructions were to become integrated in a broad political front of democratic parties seeking to take Romania out of the war. Patrascanu, though under house arrest, managed to conduct negotiations with the democratic parties and, on June 20, 1944, a National Democratic Front was established. Previously, on May 1, 1944, the Communists had signed an agreement with the Socialist Party establishing a "United Labor Front" (ULF) and binding the two parties to act together as a unit in all further trade union activities.

By April 3, 1944 the Red Army had already reached Bessarabia and the post-1940 frontier. Among the Soviet troops was a Romanian division organized by the exiled leaders in Moscow out of ex-POWs. An armistice, which had the backing both of King Michael and the National-Democratic bloc (made up of the Communist, the National Peasant, the National-Liberal and the Social-Democratic parties), came into force on August 23, 1944. A government was then formed with General Sanatescu, a military man who had kept out of politics, as Premier. Each of the four above-named parties had a representative in the cabinet; Patrascanu thus became Deputy Premier and Minister without Portfolio. This was a great victory for the Communists, who at that time were still a tiny minority, and had never been represented in any Romanian Government.

Seizure of Power

From the very beginning of its participation in the new Government the Party sought and received assistance from the occupying power. Thus, in October, after the Party had failed to disrupt the new Government, General Vinogradov informed the Premier unilaterally that he was dissatisfied with the way the Cabinet was carrying out the armistice terms and, as a result, a new Cabinet was formed with Patrascanu as Minister of Justice, Gheorghiu-Dej as Minister of Communications and Georgescu as Deputy Minister of the Interior. By then Andrei Vishinsky had arrived in Bucharest, ostensibly to conduct economic negotiations connected with implementation of the Armistice Convention. Soon after his arrival the Communists increased their activities and the Party members resigned from the Government, which was reformed on December 6, 1944 under General Radescu. The Communists retained the same seats they had had in the previous Cabinet.

In January 1945, Dej, then provisional Secretary General of the CPR, spent a month in Moscow. Upon his return to Bucharest the Party formulated the following demands: 1. an immediate land reform; 2. improved execution of the armistice terms; 3. removal of "collaborationists" from the Government; 4. trial of war criminals. These relatively restrained demands were backed by a forceful action program that entailed armed seizure of administrative buildings in towns and villages (excluding Bucharest) under the guidance of the then Undersecretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Teohari Georgescu. These seizures were followed by the illegal installation of Communists or pro-Communists as mayors, district prefects, etc. As Gheorghiu-



The Old Constitution — "A Guarantee of Liberty"
(Doru, 1949)

Picture and caption from *Romanian News* (Washington), December 30, 1951. This publication is now defunct; it used to be issued by the Communist Romanian Legation in Washington.

Dej later put it (in *Articole si cuvantari* [Bucharest], 1951, p. 103):

"Once this [Radescu] Government was installed, our fight against reactionary domination in the Government and for democratic reforms deepened. . . . Our Party adopted new ways of fighting. . . . We ordered the placing in office of new district prefects and mayors, chosen by the population, by the force of the masses. This was carried out in numerous districts. . . ."

The Party also organized shock squads, particularly from among worker groups originally created by the Iron Guard and used these to rig local trade-union elections in Bucharest factories and plants. In one of the ensuing clashes, when Communist hooligans tried to reverse an adverse vote in the "Malaxa" Works, their leader, Gheorghe Apostol, a member of the Central Committee of the CPR and president of the General Confederation of Labor, was wounded. Law and order became more and more tenuous as Soviet troops prowled the countryside committing acts of banditry; inflation was mounting as a result of exorbitant Soviet demands for reparations; and mass deportations were taking place. Riots and demonstrations broke out, culminating in Communist-organized mass meetings before the Royal Palace on February 14, 1945.

In the meantime Vishinsky had returned to Romania, and Soviet troops began disarming the Romanian Army. Once this had been accomplished, the Soviet envoy pre-

sented himself to the King and informed him that the Radescu Government did not have the confidence of the Soviet Occupation authorities and that a new and "popular" Cabinet must be formed. The young King resisted for several days but, on March 6, 1945, had to bow to Soviet pressure and accepted a Cabinet headed by Communist Petru Groza, in which the Party held the majority of posts. The National Liberal and National Peasant Parties were totally excluded. The Communist Party was in power and from then on its task was consolidation.

Purges

The Party first tightened its control over the National Democratic Front (the political group formed by the ULF and some sections from the "bourgeois" parties), thus isolating the two major opposition parties. After repeated protests from the Allies and demands by them for free elections and representative government, the Communists agreed to reorganize the Cabinet by including one representative from each of the two opposition parties, and an election campaign was launched. Both moves were temporary "retreats" designed to cement Communist power. Thus, for election purposes the Party created a so-called "Bloc of Democratic Parties" (BDP), which was to run on a single ticket and included the old groups of the NDF, with the exception of the Independent Socialists who broke with the Communist-dominated slate on the issue of a single list and ran on a separate ticket. The election, held on November 16, 1946, was a patent fraud: the Communist bloc was credited with 84 percent of the votes and they were given 384 out of 414 parliamentary seats. The Party next turned on the "bourgeois" opposition.

Using a manufactured plot directed by the security forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Groza government arrested the leaders of the National Peasant Party in the

Vasile Luca



Standard Regime Photo

Ana Pauker



Standard Regime Photo

summer of 1947. The prisoners, among them Iuliu Maniu and Ion Mihalache, respectively Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Party, were "tried" and sentenced to long prison terms on a variety of charges, including the attempt to overthrow the Government. The party was then dissolved, and the two other independent groups, the National Liberals and Independent Socialists, were driven underground.

There only remained for the Communists to discard the splinter "bourgeois" parties, such as G. Tatarescu's Liberal Party which had helped them to gain power. This done, the Romanian Communists turned to the Monarchy. They surrounded the Palace with troops of the Soviet-trained Communist division and, on December 30, 1947, Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej demanded the abdication of King Michael.

Thereafter the Party began implementing in earnest all aspects of Communist planning, including forced industrialization, collectivization of land, nationalization, labor regimentation, the destruction of all remaining civil liberties and the deliberate maintenance of a low standard of living. The newly-elected Communist Assembly approved a new Constitution (thus legalistically transforming the country into a "People's Democracy") and the Party, under orders from Moscow, "absorbed" that part of the Socialist Party with which it had been allied in the BDP. Thus, the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) was formed. At that time too, Patrascanu, the most independent and Western-oriented of the Communist leaders, was ousted from the Central Committee and purged from the Party for "nationalist deviation." He was thrown into prison and sentenced to death years later (in April 1954) for "paralysing the fight of democratic forces against fascism." (see NBIC, April 1955, page 4).

At the Party Congress (the Sixth of the CPR and the

First of the RWP), held February 21-24, 1948, the merger was approved, the new Party name ratified, new statutes accepted, and a new leadership elected. Prior to the merger, the Party numbered 750,000 members of whom 40 percent were workers; following it, membership increased to 960,000. Immediately thereafter, a great purge began, and by May 1950, 20 percent of the membership (some 192,000 persons) had been expelled.

A more spectacular purge was to follow in 1952, this time affecting the very highest members of the leadership. Ana Pauker, then Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, was relegated to political oblivion, though she escaped imprisonment. Vasile Luca, until then one of the pillars of the Party and Minister of the Economy, fared

less well: imprisoned, he was tried by a military court in October 1954 and sentenced to death; the sentence was commuted to hard labor. Teohari Georgescu, another old Party member and then Minister of the Interior, was also purged at that time, losing all Party and State posts. A reorganization of the Party's main power centers then took place. The membership of the Secretariat of the Central Committee was reduced from six to four, that of the Politburo from thirteen to nine.

According to the old statutes of the Party, a Congress should have taken place every three years, so that the present Congress (the Sixth of the CPR and the Second of the RWP), twice postponed, was therefore almost four years overdue.

II. Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party*

The long postponed Congress was held in Bucharest, December 23-28, 1955, in the Athenaeum facing the former Royal Palace. It was attended by numerous "fraternal" Communist delegations from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and the Americas. Seated on a special dais with members of the Presidium of the Assembly were: A. I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party; Marshal Chu Teh, Deputy Premier of the Chinese People's Republic and Secretary of the Party's Central Committee; Dolores Ibarruri (better known as La Pasionaria), Secretary General of the exiled Spanish Communist Party. From the European Communist countries only Rakosi, First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, was singled out for this "honor." Also present, but in less conspicuous positions, were the following representatives from other Satellite countries: from Poland, Zenon Nowak, Politburo Member and First Deputy Premier; from Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Kopecky, also Politburo Member and Deputy Premier; from Bulgaria, the highest Party official, Todor Jivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee; from Albania, Haki Toska, a Central Committee Member.

The Congress adopted the following agenda: 1. a report on Party activities by Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Central Committee; 2. a report on the Central Revision (financial) Committee by Nicolae Guina, a member of the Party's Central Committee and Romanian ambassador to Yugoslavia; 3. a report on the directives of the Five Year Plan by Chivu Stoica, President of the Council of Ministers and Member of the Politburo; 4. a report on the adoption of new Party Statutes by Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary of the Central Committee (the Statutes were originally issued in August 1954; see NBIC, Sept. 1954, p. 54); 5. the election of the new leadership.

Party Affairs

The main speech was delivered by Gheorghiu-Dej

* Texts of speeches appeared in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), 3474 to 3479, Dec. 24-29, 1955.

(*Scinteia* [Bucharest], Dec. 24-25, 1955). The Party leader reviewed changes in all aspects of national life over the last decade and outlined targets of the next Five Year Plan, which began this year. The survey was remarkable not only for its inordinate length but also for the unusual amount of factual information it contained; for the first time since they have risen to power in Romania, the Communists have seen fit to release detailed absolute figures not only for distant plan fulfillments but also for past accomplishments—or the lack of them. Still, though much of the data is of unique importance, the most revealing passages in Dej's speech deal not so much with figures as with human beings, particularly Party members.

What the Party chief had to say about the prolonged, almost continuous difficulties within the Party echelons, high and low, explains to a large extent why Romania alone among the Satellite countries, was unable (or unwilling) to stage a Party Congress in the immediate post-Stalinist era. Furthermore, though years have elapsed since the last major purge in the top Party echelon—that of the Pauker group in 1952—its effects are still being felt in the organization. From numerous comments on the topic by Dej and others it is clear that the leadership has been unable so far to consolidate its position to its own satisfaction. In contrast to many of the other Party Congresses in the area, the Romanian Congress reflected not the confidence of victory but the uncertainty, the harshness and nervousness of continued struggle. Three major battles still have to be won: unity in the ranks must be established; the Party must attract workers, not bureaucrats; the Party must attempt to reach the people, thus putting an end to its present isolation.

Party Disunity

Time and time again Dej found it necessary to stress the crucial importance of Party "cohesion" and to point to dangers inherent in a lack of it. Many of these reminders referred to the past, but their tone of urgency left no doubt but that the present and future were uppermost in the



"The Presidium of the Congress, after listening to the report on the activity of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party, as presented by comrade Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej. In the first row, from left to right, comrades Iosif Chisinevski, Matyas Rakosi, Chu Teh, the latter's interpreter, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Constantin Pirvulescu, Chivu Stoica, A. I. Kirichenko, Dolores Ibarruri, Gheorghe Apostol; in the second and third rows, from left to right, comrades Stefan Voitec, Alexandru Draghici, Ene Turcanu, Ludovic Csupor, Petru Borila, Florian Danalache, Emil Bodnarus, Leontin Salajan, Ianos Fazekas, Alexandru Moghioros, Miron Constantinescu, Nicolae Ceausescu, Dumitru Coliu, Constanta Craciun, Teodor Iordachescu. Left background, leaders of the delegations of fraternal Communist and Workers' parties invited to the Congress; right background, members of the Secretariat and of the committees of the Congress."

Scinteia (Bucharest), December 25, 1955

speaker's mind. The official "explained," but he also warned and threatened. He did speak about "intra-Party democracy" and the necessity to preserve collective leadership, but never without adding an immediate reminder that the essential task was to preserve what he termed the Party's "monolithic unity."

This "unity" and the present social order, according to Dej, are still being threatened by forces both internal and external:

"We must remember that our successes do not weaken but only rouse the desperate resistance of the enemy, that the hostile forces in the interior, fed on illusions by their protectors abroad, continue to hanker for the old privileges and the old state of affairs, that aggressive imperialism is organizing military bases all around the countries of the Socialist camp and is sending against us all kinds of agents who are dropped by parachutes—spies, diversionists, and saboteurs. Any covering up of class warfare is alien to the Communists. . . ."

The crucial fight will have to take place within the Party, the first line of defense: "Lenin and Stalin pointed out that it is impossible for the proletariat to maintain and consolidate its State power for the complete victory of Socialism without a party which is strong through its cohesion and iron discipline." Reviewing the Party's past endeavors to achieve such "cohesion," Dej revealed that convulsion followed upon convulsion right up to the present: "Our Party has proved its unshakeable strength in the face of harsh tests to the unity of its ranks, and its internal cohesion, both in the period of victory and the strengthening of the people's power [1944-48] and in the

period of transition to the building of Socialism [1948 to the present]."

Dej then specifically referred to the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu purge and pointed out that "Hostile elements penetrated into a number of leading organs of the Party, even into the Central Committee." The official disclosed that a method of "bloc-enrollment" had been used by these "fractional, anti-Party group of rightist deviationists led by Ana Pauker . . . Vasile Luca . . . and Teohari Georgescu," and, through its use, had succeeded in introducing into the Party "all kinds of hostile, careerist, dishonest and degenerate elements." As will be seen in a discussion of the present composition of the Party, many of these "unwanted" elements are still in the Party, so that the fight for its "purity" is by no means over.

This is also indicated in the following passage:

"We are duty bound to draw the following lessons for future activities: the smallest deviation from the Leninist principle of Party organization seriously damages the Party; the existence of factions within the Party is incompatible with the organizational and ideological principles of the Party and cannot be tolerated; control over the activity of the Party organs and organizations and over the activity of Party members—regardless of the positions they hold—is a law of the Party."

Whereas in some of the other Satellites, there have been direct and indirect indications of some Party concession to national feelings and a decrease in the craven, monotonous adulation of the Soviet Union, the Romanian Congress speeches followed the old pattern of repeated (and, incidentally, always applauded) references to the guiding

"historic experience of the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The one allusion to the possibility of variety in the Communist pattern was both short and perfunctory: "At the same time, the history of the establishment of the People's Democratic regime confirms the brilliant Leninist idea that the unity of what is basic and essential is not violated but insured by variety in detail, in peculiarities. All the nations will attain Socialism, Lenin teaches. This is inevitable. However, not all will attain it in precisely the same manner. Each one will make a specific contribution in one form or another, in one variety or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat, at one pace or another of the Socialist transformation of the various facets of social life."

The whole passage seems mainly to be a justification for the present development of Romanian collectivization which is running far behind schedule, encompassing little more than a quarter of the country's arable land. It does not appear to presage a "liberalization of the various facets of social life." Criticism, such as is now heard in Poland and, to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, is not likely to be countenanced. Of course, the expected remarks about "constructive criticism" were voiced, and so was the promise that if such criticism were to be unlawfully "throttled," the culprits would be "severely punished." The important passage in this respect was one in which the Party chief defined the restrictions on unsolicited criticism:

"At the same time the Party organizations must take a stand against the hostile elements who change criticism and use it for demagogical and slanderous purposes in order to undermine the socialist discipline of labor, to compromise the good cadres devoted to the Party and to weaken the confidence of the working people in the justice of the Party's cause. . . ."

Party Composition

The relative harshness of some of the pronouncements quoted and the relative rigidity of the line they prescribe can be partly explained by the grievous failures encountered by the Party in both the quantity and quality of its recruits. The figures indicate that membership has been shrinking and that a majority of the adherents of the so-called Workers' Party are not in fact workers or from worker backgrounds. Thus, despite industrialization and all that it has meant in terms of priority given to heavy industry, in terms of a rapid growth in the working force and in terms of more concentrated indoctrination, the Party has been losing ground where it could least afford it.

As far back as 1947, before the merger with the Social-Democratic Party Communist Party membership amounted to 912,000 (Dej in the Cominform journal of June 23rd, 1950). After 1948, as Dej explained at the Congress, "192,000 members were turned out of the Party," thus reducing it to 720,000. Then came the startling revelation that present membership is at its postwar low—only 538,815 members and 56,583 candidate members. In the last few years, therefore, despite a strenuous recruiting campaign, the Party incurred a net loss of 182,000 Party mem-

bers. Some of these losses were no doubt suffered through hitherto unannounced wholesale purges of the lower echelons, for Dej's allusion to counteraction of the packing of the Party by the Pauker faction seems to point to large-scale dismissals in 1952. But these losses presumably could have been made up long ago. That the answer lies elsewhere can be guessed from a number of statements by the Party Secretary indicating that members have had to be dropped from the rolls because their papers were not in order; that is, because they had not paid their dues, attended meetings, or fulfilled other requirements to maintain their good standing in the organization. For instance, Dej said:

"During the changing of Party documents [identity cards, etc.], there were many cases of unlawful expulsions. . . . Thus, in a number of Bucharest regional organizations at a certain time almost one-third [sic] of the total Party members were expelled from the Party. The Central Committee took steps to correct this state of affairs, and thousands of good Party members were reinstated."

It can be taken for granted that persons assigned the task of checking Party members' papers would not have had the temerity to expel "thousands" of members if their Party records had been in order. Nor has the simple formula of reinstating such persons solved the problem. Party members are apathetic and the desirable persons refuse to join it. In fact, there are strong indications that a majority of the 182,000 members, who represent the net loss suffered in the last few years, were indeed of working-class origin or workers by occupation.

According to complaints he voiced at the Congress, Dej puts the present percentage of workers in the Party at 42.61, up from 37.02 percent in 1951. These figures tell a long story of failure, but they do not tell the whole story. To understand the full measure of the setback to Party ambitions it is necessary to turn back to Dej's diagnosis in his Cominform journal article of June 23, 1950. At that time he stated that in 1947 workers already constituted 40 percent of the total membership and that, after the membership check (that is, the expulsions of the following year), "the social composition improved and the number of workers increased." In other words, by 1950, workers should have represented substantially more than 40 percent and not, as now stated, only 37.02 percent for 1951. It is possible, of course, that many workers left the Party between 1948 and 1951, but that too would have been contrary to Party plans. A plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in July 1950 (*Rezolutii si Hotariri ale C.C. [Bucharest], 1954*) had decreed that worker membership had to increase to 60 percent within a 2-3 year period and that, consequently, 80 percent of all new candidates were to be of proletarian origin. According to the Dej account at the Congress, only 47.93 percent of Party recruits from 1952 to date were of such origin. The Party Secretary summed up the situation as follows:

"The social composition of those accepted into the ranks of the Party candidates continues to remain unsatisfactory. . . . We must insure in the ranks of our Party an increase in the number of workers, especially those from the large

industries who are working at machines, in such a manner that workers' elements may become preponderant in our Party—the vanguard Party of the working class.”

At the moment, the workers' "vanguard" contains more bureaucrats than workers—both in terms of background and actual occupation. Thus, the grand total of Party members working in both industry and agriculture, and including both workers and clerks, amounts to only 62 percent of the total. The rest are divided among State institutions (some 22 percent) and the Party's agencies (16 percent). Far fewer than 50 percent of the first category can possibly be workers and of these only a fraction probably belong to the category of workers in heavy industry.

Party Deficiencies

Small wonder, then, that the Party Secretary concentrated some of his sharpest rebukes on "bureaucratism" of Party members and their inability to discharge their appointed tasks in almost all sectors of national life. Bungling, apathy, negligence and pettiness permeate Party work; huge masses of unnecessary papers, orders, regulations, instructions and directives crush initiative and efficiency; opportunism has replaced what little enthusiasm there ever was. "All these deficiencies," comments the speaker, "are due in the first place to the bureaucratization of certain Party cadres who have lost touch with concrete life, who do not feel its fervor and do not see the direction in which it is developing. Bureaucratism covers with its mantle all that is alive, trying to stereotype life, preventing the dissemination of the new and advanced. . . ." Other criticisms from various parts of the speech include the following:

"Paper work and meetings must be reduced to the necessary minimum. . . . Often the sections of the Central Committee fail to report new decisions in time, fail to make a profound analysis of the central problems of their sectors of activity, and show a tendency to carry out their work in a bureaucratic manner. . . . There are comrades—and unfortunately not a few of them—who do not see or do not want to see the good results achieved by our Party organizations. . . . Let us stimulate the creative daring of the Party activists and members. . . . The practice of allocating cadres only on the basis of files and of appointing men in a bureaucratic manner . . . is quite widespread. . . . Notwithstanding all the successes achieved by the Party in Marxist-Leninist education, it still continues to lag behind the demands of life and behind the needs of the Party's practical activities. . . . The principal shortcomings in the content of Party propaganda and ideological work in general is dogmatism and the parrot-like, uncreative mastering of Marxist-Leninist teaching. . . ."

All these shortcomings in Party training, orientation and work have had an adverse impact in many sectors. Among other consequences, there has been a continued isolation of the Party by the people; as Dej put it, "mass-political work" has been marked by "insufficient contact with . . . the problems occupying the working people." He also scored "weaknesses in the leadership and guidance of the people's councils" and recommended that they "stimulate

and make the widest use of the working people's initiative and attract them in various ways to active participation in the management of communal affairs."

With reference to mass organizations, the following comments were made:

Trade Unions—"The shortcomings in their work are due in the first place to the fact that many Party organizations are paying insufficient attention to the leadership and day-to-day guidance of trade-union activity."

Youth—" . . . serious shortcomings persist in this field. The guiding of Union of Working Youth—UTM—organizations by Party organs is being carried out more at the level of regional, town and raion committees than in enterprises, villages, and schools, where the mass of youth is. Here the guidance and help given by Party organizations to the UTM and their direct participation in work among youth are unsatisfactory."

Women—"The Party organizations, the executive committees of the people's councils, the trade unions, and the Union of Working Youth are generally showing an altogether insufficient concern with the specific problems of work among women."

Art and Culture

The line taken on literary expression and art in general was harsher and nearer to the old Stalinist line than in any other country in the area. All "retrogressive ideas" were to be fought and, as Constantinescu put it, "The principle of Party spirit in literature and art embodies the ideal which results from the objective development of society." What must be depicted is the "heroic struggle of the working class, of the workers in factories and construction sites."

Constantinescu fiercely attacked those who believed that there is now "a so-called suspension of the class struggle," and emphatically stated that "the past never comes back." He also referred to "more damaging [effects] of the appearance in some works of certain writers, both Romanian and of other nationalities [Hungarian, Polish, Soviet?] of certain bourgeois-nationalist manifestations [which] . . . must be unmasked and unsparingly eliminated." Constantinescu went further: he answered those critics of the rigid Party line in art who, though they had not so far raised their heads, might want to do so in the future. "Behind the alleged theory of the freedom of creation," he said, "is hidden the tendency to remove creators from objective reality . . . in this fight, the unions of creative artists can make a great contribution to the enlightenment of those who are confused."

The Economy

The key economic report was delivered by Dej. Other Politburo members, including Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnaras, Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chisinevski and Petru Borila, corroborated the First Secretary's statements, each adding details on some specific sector. The speeches reviewed past achievements, the present situation, and the Five Year Plan which began this year.

A general appraisal of all the given data points to the

Table I

Main Production Sectors

Items		1938	1950	1955	1955 Index		Planned increase for 1960	Original Five Year Pl. ¹
					1938 = 100	1950 = 100		
Electric power	mil. kwh	1,130	2,113	4,300	381	204	80-85% ⁴	4,700
Coal	000 tons	2,826	3,890	6,200	219	159	80-90% ⁴	8,533
Oil	000 tons	6,594	5,047	10,575	160	210	28% ⁴	10,000
Methane gas	mil. c.m.	300 ³	1,950	3,900	1,300	200	2.6 times ⁴	3,900
Iron ore	000 tons	139	392	600	432	153	1.8-2 times	
Manganese ore	000 tons	60	93	390	650	419	40%	
Pig iron	000 tons	133	320	575	432	180	approx. 2.00 ⁴	800
Steel	000 tons	284	555	765	269	138	2-2.2 times ⁴	1,252
Rolled steel	000 tons	318	459	567	178	128 ²	85-90%	
Lead	tons	5,455 ³	8,584	11,100	203	129		
Machine production	mil. lei	13,850	43,950	115,275	832	262		
Electro-technical production	mil. lei	2,980	6,207	22,340	750	360		
Sulfuric acid	tons	43,900	51,631	92,000	210	178	2.3 times	143,000
Sodium carbonate	tons	35,000	54,158	80,000	229	148		
Chemical production	mil. lei	9,348	16,650	50,530	540	304		
Cement	000 tons	510	1,028	2,000	392	195	approx. 80% ⁴	2,850
Textiles	mil. lei	24,818	40,716	70,000	282	172		
Footwear	000 pairs	—	11,212	17,700	—	158	approx. 45%	23,400
Edible oil	tons	17,800	35,864	48,000	270	134	approx. 90%	72,000
Canned meat	tons	8,455	11,583	39,000	461	337		
Sugar	tons	95,100	87,200	135,000	142	155	approx. 2.2 times	278,000

1. These figures from *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Dec. 16, 1950.

2. Figure should have read 124.

3. These figures were given as 1,859,000 for natural gas and 6,394 for lead in *Anuarul Statistic al Romaniei* (Bucharest), 1940.

4. In his Congress Speech Premier Stoica gave the following absolute figures as targets for 1960: Oil, 13.5 million tons;

Methane gas, "at least 10 billion cubic meters"; Cement, "more than 3.5 million tons." Stoica also referred to a 1960 production of "approximately 1.3 million tons of meat, live weight—of which 600,000 tons will be pork; 25 million hectoliters of cow's milk; and 34,000 tons of wool—of which 20,000 tons will be fine and semi-fine wool. . . ." Other figures released were: Electric Power, 8 billion kwh; Coal, 11-11.6 million tons; Pig Iron, 1.15 million tons; Steel, 1.6 million tons.

following salient facts: 1. substantial accomplishments have been scored in overall industrial development, though some of the major targets of the original Five Year Plan were not reached; heavy industry will receive continued priority in the future and the tempo of its development will be approximately that of the First Five Year Plan; 2. the regime has suffered a major setback in its collectivization plans and the targets in the Second Plan for further "socialization" of agriculture are in fact those that should have been reached in the First Plan; 3. the regime has suffered a tremendous defeat in its productivity plans and, while in the past these deficiencies could be partly made up by additional manpower, the success of the present Plan will depend to a large extent on raising productivity; 4. whatever growth has been achieved in industries producing the means of production has been largely at the expense of development of consumer goods industries—that is, it has been achieved by a deliberate and artificial restriction on the rise in the people's living standards. The reports also indicate that the revisions in planning inaugurated in 1953 will be maintained, particularly with respect to increases in agricultural production.

Investments

Table III gives a graphic illustration of the regime's stress on heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods industries: the former received outlays amounting to 50.6 percent of the total when it had been scheduled to receive only 42.1 percent; the latter had to make do with only 7.4 percent, although the Plan had provided for 9.3 percent. Dej commented:

"A serious lag in the realization of investments established by the Five Year Plan was found in the consumer goods industry. This is due to the fact that during the Five Year Plan period no proper attention was paid to the development of light and food industries. In recent years investment funds allocated to consumer goods industry have been increased considerably and so have the achievements. Nevertheless . . . the allocated funds were not used."

Dej implied that agriculture had been sorely neglected before the New Course, but that, as a result of strenuous efforts since then, the lag had been made up: "Based on the directives of the plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP of August 1953, agriculture has exceeded its share of investments provided for in the Five Year Plan, namely

10.4 percent as compared with the 10 percent planned." But the increase was an emergency measure; agriculture will continue to be more favored than in the Stalinist period, yet the main emphasis will be (and indeed always has been) elsewhere: "In the five main branches of the industry, namely the oil industry, the electrical industry, the steel and iron industry, the machine-building industry, and the chemical industry, were concentrated 67 percent or two-thirds of the investments in industry, which shows the main allocation of the investment funds." Allotments for these key industries in the Second Plan are approximately on the same level—some 66 percent of investments in industry. As for agriculture, some increase will take place, though the total percentage remains relatively low; according to Stoica, "Of the total investments [in the Second Five Year Plan] 12.5 percent is allocated for agriculture and forestry; this is more than 70 percent more than in the First Five Year Plan."

Costs

After claiming that costs had been reduced in such industries as oil, methane gas and others, Dej pointed out that "Unfortunately, in a number of branches such as coal, lumber, cellulose, paper, sugar, meat, cotton, and others, production costs were not only not reduced during the Five Year Plan, but increased." As a result, the national economy had been deprived of "important savings." For the future, Dej warned, "The reduction of production costs must be regarded as a central problem of the entire organization of production."

Industrial Production

The achievements of regime planning were summed up by Dej as follows:

"In 1938, due to Romania's industrial backwardness, the share of the national income earned by agriculture was higher than that of industry, whereas today, as a result of the trebling of industrial production, almost half the national income is earned by industry while the part originating from agriculture is little more than a quarter, although the absolute level of the national income earned by agriculture has increased compared with 1938."

All the speakers stressed that heavy industry would continue to be given priority, though Dej added a qualifying phrase which might indicate that planning will be somewhat more realistic than in the past: "[Special priority will be given] those branches of heavy industry which have their raw material supply insured inside the country—the oil, chemical, iron and steel, rare metals, and coal industries."

Overall industrial production in the Second Five Year Plan is to increase by 60 to 65 percent, with capital goods industries rising by 70 to 75 percent, (sector A), and consumer goods production by 50 to 55 percent (sector B). "The average annual increase of industrial production," said Dej, "will be 10 to 10.5 at constant prices, including 11 to 11.5 percent in sector A . . . and 8.5 to 9 percent in sector B." This compares with increases of 15 and 12 per-

Table II Structure of the Agricultural Sector (land area)

	1950		1955	
	arable	agric.	arable	agric.
I. "Socialist" sector consisting of:				
a) State sector	12.0%	23.8%	26.5%	35.2%
b) Collective farms	9.3%	21.8%	13.7%	25.5%
c) Partnerships	2.7%	2.0%	8.3%	6.6%
d) Temporary associations	—	—	4.1%	2.8%
II. Private farms	88.0%	76.2%	73.5%	64.8%

Percentage Investments in the First (1950-1955) and Second (1955-1960) Five Year Plans—Table III

	Planned for original Five Year Plan	Fulfillment in the 1950-1955 Plan	* Planned for 1955-1960
Industry	51.4	58.0	56.0
A. Capital goods industry	42.1	50.6	50.0
B. Consumer goods industry	9.3	7.4	6.0
Construction	2.0	4.6	2.5
Agriculture and Forestry	10.0	10.4	12.5
Transportation and Telecommunication	16.2	11.2	11.5
Circulation of goods	2.2	2.5	2.5 ¹
Social and cultural	13.4	?	—
Housing	3.2 ²	3.8	5.5
State administration	2.0	?	Local industry 3.0 ²
Scientific and geological exploration	2.8	?	Education-culture 2.5 ² Scientific Inst. 1.5 ² Other branches 2.5 ²
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

1. Instead of "Circulation of goods" the category is now defined as "Trade and food, collections and supplies."

2. A new category. 3. Included in "Social and cultural."

Percentage Investments in Industry in the First and Second Five Year Plans—Table IV

	Fulfillment 1951-1955	Planned for 1955-1960
Oil and Gas industry	28.3	Oil 20.5 Gas 5.0
Power	13.1	11.0
Iron ore & steel industries	10.0	12.0
Machine building and metal processing industries	8.6	4.5
Chemical, cellulose & paper ind.	7.7	13.0
Coal industry	7.3	8.0
Extractive ind. of non-ferrous ore & non-ferrous and "non-metallurgical" metallurgical industry	6.0	6.5
Food industry	5.1	4.5
Building materials industry	5.2	4.5
Timber and wood processing ind.	3.9	4.0
Textile ind. ready to wear & leather goods	2.5	5.0
Other branches	2.3	1.5

cent respectively in the First Five Year Plan, according to Stoica.

As far as specific industries are concerned, a number of revealing comments were made with reference to the iron and steel, chemical and coal industries. Iron and steel, according to Dej, are "still lagging far behind the economy's need for metal." It is also interesting to juxtapose the Secretary's statement that those industries, including iron and steel, for which there is a basis in the country would be developed most, with the statement that "Our own coke and iron ore production does not cover more than approximately 50 percent of the needs of the iron and steel industry." Not only is the coke and ore production inadequate, but at present, according to Dej's admission, "the coal industry is lagging by approximately 2 million tons annually." Coal production will therefore almost double in the next five years and iron ore production will increase by an even higher percentage (See Table I). Considering the admitted shortages and the consequent high percentage of ore imports, the price that will have to be paid by the people will continue to be exorbitant.

Romania is rich in oil, but development of that industry is necessarily a slow, costly process. A 110 percent increase in production was claimed over 1950 at the end of the First Five Year Plan; in the next five-year period, though, only a 28 percent increase is planned. It appears that in the Second Five Year Plan fuller use is to be made of oil products, particularly as applied to a fast-growing chemical industry: "In the First Five Year Plan the production of the chemical industry almost tripled. In the coming years we shall develop the principal branches of the chemical industry and in the first place the petrochemical industry. . . ." Dej also stressed that "methane gas will be better used as a raw material for the chemical industry than in the past. . . ."

Discussing in detail the future of the chemical industry, Dej revealed that a "rapid deforestation with grave consequences" had ensued from over-use of resinous lumber for cellulose production. He promised that this situation would be remedied through the extensive use of "rush from the Danube delta" as a new raw material to replace lumber in making cellulose.

Labor Productivity

"What are the main shortcomings which are slowing up even more rapid unfolding of our building?" asked Dej. He answered his question as follows:

"Although in some branches, such as the machine-building industry, and oil industry, important increases in labor productivity were obtained and the tasks of the Five Year Plan were exceeded, for industry as a whole labor productivity increased only 47.7 percent, instead of the 70 percent [actually 75 percent according to *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), Dec. 16, 1950] called for by the plan. The coal mining industry . . . received almost 3 billion lei . . . nevertheless labor productivity in this branch decreased [sic] to 92 percent as compared with 1950 [!]. . . . In the iron and steel industry, the food industry, the textile industry, and in other industries, labor productivity increased only slightly and

remained below the provisions of the Five Year Plan. The main causes of labor productivity lagging are the low level of interest in the introduction of new techniques, advanced labor methods, and the establishment of norms on a technical basis; shortcomings in the fields of labor organization; the unsatisfactory use of equipment and mechanisms; the insufficient mechanization of heavy labor-consuming processes, and losses from labor time."

Behind this technical verbiage is the reality of labor resistance, collusion between factory heads and their employees, apathy among Party members, isolation and rejection of Party militants and, in general, a successful endeavor on the part of the people to take for themselves illegally that share of their labor which the regime had intended to divert to its own ends. In short, in the failure of the regime to regiment labor, there is a significant Party failure.

The people have refused to apply norms, to emulate shockworkers, or to heed the other regime appeals for various speed-up methods. They took a rest from work whenever they felt physically unable to carry on under the work pressures imposed on them. The situation is described by Dej in the following remarks:

"In the course of 1954 alone losses of productive time in republican industry reached almost 9 million man-days, of which 5.7 million man-days were due to absenteeism and 2.3 million to absence from work approved by managements and enterprises. The elimination of these losses would have allowed an additional increase of labor productivity amounting to 5 percent. . . . J. V. Stalin stressed that the technical norms are a great and . . . organizing force of production, that without technical norms planning of the economy is impossible. . . . Most of the statistical norms used are based on evaluations. . . . Norm setting is often limited to the arrangement of norms in such a manner that a certain average be made regardless of the percentage of increase in labor productivity. . . . The achievements of the increased labor productivity planned for 1955 alone would have released approximately 130,000 workers to meet these needs [of 'acute manpower shortages' in some sectors]."

So far, the regime has been able to increase its labor force significantly, mainly—as Dej indicated—through the absorption of some 300,000 women into production in the course of the Five Year Plan alone. But these reserves have now been depleted. As Stoica put it, "Of the total increase in industrial production during the Second Five Year Plan, 75 to 80 percent must be obtained by increasing labor productivity." The regime intends to increase this labor productivity by "at least 45 to 50 percent" in the next five years, a far more realistic target than that of the previous Plan. Still, even so comparatively low a goal will be difficult to reach, since the figure corresponds to the increase obtained in the first Plan, and it is far easier to improve performance at the earliest stage of industrialization (when new machinery is introduced) than it is after development has already taken place.

All the references to norms, labor productivity, "advanced work methods," "better organization," etc., point to a gradual but inexorable rise in work tempo over the next few years. But with an ineffectual Party and a hostile labor force, it is doubtful that much will be achieved, particu-

larly since present policies do not call for the use of force. Some reorganization in the manpower pool might help. There are indications that many enterprises have "stocked up" on personnel in order to camouflage their inability to work according to prescribed norms. Thus, Dej made a reference to the fact that "It is known that in many enterprises there are more workers and employees than are needed for production." But productivity and manpower distribution are not isolated problems and their solution also demands the solution of related deficiencies. Constantinescu summed it up as follows:

"To fulfill this great task [the Second Five Year Plan] it is absolutely necessary to eliminate those shortcomings and errors which the general report so precisely pointed out, such as defective planning and supply, the inefficient increase of labor productivity, the nonfulfillment of the tasks of reducing production costs, the lack of concern by certain enterprises for increasing Socialist profitability, and the incomplete utilization of machines."

Agriculture


The First Five Year Plan prescribed "Socialization" of more than 50 percent of the land by the end of 1955; little more than half this target has been reached (see Table II). Furthermore, much of the progress made in this respect has been achieved not so much by increasing the area and membership of real collectives as by encouragement of the lowest forms of rural grouping, the so-called partnerships and "temporary associations." The regime hopes eventually to convert these into kolkhozes but in the meantime it has had to adopt a go-slow policy. The goal for 1960 is both vague and relatively unambitious: "... in 1960, the socialist sector of agriculture will be preponderant both as regards area and production," said Dej.

Not only is some 73 percent of the arable land still in private hands, but the social structure of villages is still overwhelmingly that of independent farming. The figures released by Dej are: members of collective farms, 5.5 percent of agricultural population; members of agricultural associations, 5.8 percent; agricultural workers, under 1 percent; working peasants with small farms, 45.2 percent; working peasants with medium farms, 40.5 percent; kulaks,



Grain Production (in millions of tons).

Scinteia (Bucharest), January 13, 1956



"Growth of industrial production as compared with 1948."

Scinteia (Bucharest), December 31, 1955

2 percent. Collective farms and agricultural associations cover an area of more than 1,320,000 hectares, with the simple associations taking up another 43,000 hectares. There are 6,325 collectives and agricultural associations with some 382,000 families, and approximately 3,000 industrial crop associations with almost 80,000 families. Total arable land now amounts to 9.7 million hectares, up from 9.4 million at the start of the First Plan.

As a result of greater investments, more mechanization and better fertilizers after the 1953 Central Committee resolution, coupled to the relatively lenient attitude toward collectivization and some concessions to farmers, production has gone up. This is no doubt also partly due to an exceptionally good harvest this year. Claims include the following statements by Dej:

"As a consequence of the measures taken for the development of agriculture, the production anticipated in the Five Year Plan for cereals for 1955 was exceeded as far back as 1954. The goal of 10 million tons of wheat and corn, set by the conference organized by the Central Committee of the RWP in February 1955, was exceeded in 1955 by about one million tons. . . . In the period 1951 to 1955, 405,000 hectares were planted with forests, thus exceeding the tasks of the Five Year Plan. . . ."

Successes were also apparently registered in increasing livestock. The greatest increase was that of hogs, up from some 3,523,000 at the end of 1953 (see NBIC, March 1954, p. 9) to a present total of 5.6 million head. As for mechanization, the figures given are confused and contradictory and seem to indicate that units of measurement have been changed. Dej claimed that "there are at present 221 MTS [there were already 218 at the end of 1952] . . . with more than 30,000 tractors expressed in terms of conventional 15-horsepower tractors." There were some 12,500 of such tractors in MTS in 1954, though these may have been actual tractors and not 15-hp units. Dej compounded the confusion when he said that "By the end of the Second Five Year Plan MTS and State farms will increase up to 37,000 conventional tractors."

Not everything has gone smoothly, though. For instance, Dej remarked that "the overall agricultural production and marketable production are not increasing in direct proportion to the technical-material conditions created by the people's regime." He also strongly criticized the Party for allowing collectives to use up the "indivisible funds and their communal wealth"; that is, for allowing kolkhoz members to distribute their profits rather than reinvesting them. He also lashed out at the tendency of "some Party and State organs" to let the "Socialist transformation of agriculture proceed by itself." It seems that the Party members either did nothing or pressed for full collectivization. Dej recommends a middle course: to entice the farmers into the simplest forms of cooperation so that they may continue to produce the maximum, particularly with reference to deliveries to the State, while being more easily drawn into the collective sector.

The Party Secretary referred again and again to the necessity to proceed with collectivization, but he was careful to stress that this should be based "on free consent and on the complete freedom of each to choose the date and the person he wants to join for mutual help." In extolling the virtues of collective farms, Dej inadvertently revealed the superiority of individual farms. The following table shows how the "average crops of the collective farms and of the individual sector increased in recent years in the Cluj region": [kilograms per hectare]

	<i>Collectives</i>	<i>Individual Farms</i>
1952	900	537
1953	2,024	1,355
1954	1,462	1,108
1955	2,851	2,624

The 1954 crops fell because of bad weather, but what is remarkable is that, from 1953 on—that is, from the time the Stalinist line of strangulation of private sector production was relaxed—individual farmers have been fast catching up with the favored collectives. Kolkhoz production 1952-55 increased 3.2 times, that of the private farms 4.9 times. It is in the light of such performance and the fact that, as Dej pointed out, the percentage of medium farmers has gone up from 34 to 40.5 percent, that present regime policy toward the individual farmer must be viewed. That policy is presently to let the medium farmer alone if he refuses to join the collectives: "There are still cases of confusion of medium farmers with kulaks as regards the application of retrenchment measures."

Targets for 1960 include: 60 to 70 percent of all marketable agricultural production to come from the "Socialist" sector; 380 MTS; 15 million tons of grain of which wheat and rye are scheduled to comprise 5.5 million tons (this is up from a 1955 total of 11 million tons); "another 10,300 new tractors and other agricultural machines." A special effort will be made to make State farms profitable; the reference to their failure so far is perhaps the most damning comment made by the Party Secretary in the whole of his lengthy speech:

"The contribution of the State farms to the centralized fund of the State does not correspond to the land at their

disposal and to the equipment with which they have been supplied. Their production is not stable from year to year and is not characterized by a continuous increase."

Living Standards

Real wages are alleged to have increased 28 percent in the last five years, and another 30 percent increase is planned in the present Plan. These figures, even if true, are far below the level of the effort put out by the people in these years of forced industrialization. Further, Dej found it necessary to state: "... we must point out that we have not entirely reached the living standards planned for 1955. We are Communists and we are not afraid to show openly that in this respect we have had serious shortcomings too."

The volume of goods sold yearly was about 28 billion lei in 1955, allegedly twice as much as in 1950 and three times as much as in 1949. Dej claimed that the abolition of ration cards had stimulated trade, and he stressed that in spite of the growth in cooperatives, there would be no drastic curtailment of the activities of small tradesmen: "Due attention must be given to the trade practiced by small producers, who at this stage still play an important role in supplying the population." Speaking of "a number of difficulties in the consumer goods industries," Petru Borila claimed that these "were due to the fact that agricultural production lagged behind the raw material requirements of industry." This may be partly true, and the supply situation may have improved somewhat as a result of greater concern with agricultural production but, on the whole, on the basis of available figures, the Romanian consumer is not going to fare much better in the Second Five Year Plan than he did in the First.

Foreign Trade

The volume of trade with foreign countries was said to have increased twice over 1950, and 70 percent of Romania's trade is now with members of the Soviet bloc. Trade with the West was described as 2.5 times as large as in 1950 and involves transactions with a majority of the 62 countries which now trade with Romania.

As for the next Plan, the accent is on closer economic collaboration with the other Satellites. Said Dej: "When they work out their development plans these countries bear in mind not only their own needs but also the needs of the other countries of the Socialist camp. . . . The convention signed by the Romanian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Czechoslovak Republic provides, on the basis of mutual help commencing in 1956, for the building of certain plants which will produce cellulose from rush."

It seems therefore that, unlike conditions under the First Plan, major industrial help is not going to come from the USSR, but from the more advanced captive countries of the orbit. This would leave the USSR in a position to concentrate on supplying industrial equipment and personnel to China and to underdeveloped countries outside the Communist orbit. Constantinescu gave further details on the new arrangements:

"... the specific character of industrial production in each People's Democracy is determined by the volume and character of the raw material resources in the respective country, by the technical experience and skill of the workers and engineers. From this point of view Romania has particularly favorable conditions for the development of the power industry, based on waterfalls, solid fuels, and uranium ore, as well as of the chemical industry, based on oil products, distillery and methane gases, coal, sulphur, and salt."

III. Regime Leaders

*The following are brief biographies of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' [Communist] Party. All of them were members of this ruling body before the Second Congress and were re-elected to it. Draghici and Ceausescu were formerly alternate members.**

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej

Dej, who until recently held the post of Premier and is now First Secretary of the Party, is probably the dominant member of the ruling group. He was born on November 8, 1901 in Barlad, Moldavia. Little is known of his early youth, but it appears that his formal education ended at the elementary school level. He is known to be persistent, adaptable and an excellent organizer, and to be endowed with a sharp mind. He frequently contributes to such Communist publications as *Democratie Nouvelle* (Paris), *Pravda* (Moscow), *For a Lasting Peace* [The Cominform Journal] and *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest). He is divorced and has two daughters.

1922-32—Worked on street car lines of Galati.

1929—Joined the Communist Party of Romania.

1932—Dismissed from Galati street car lines for Communist activities.

1933-44—Arrested for his part in the railway workshop strike at Grivita, sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Released by the Antonescu government in spring 1944 to placate Red Army.

1944 (Spring)—Delegate to meeting which set up the National Democratic Front.

Nov. 1944-Mar. 1945—Minister of Communications.

Mar. 1945-Apr. 1948—Minister of Economic Affairs.

Oct. 1945—Elected Secretary General of the CPR and Member of the Politburo, a position he has held uninterruptedly since then.

1946—Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.

Nov. 1946—Elected Deputy to the National Assembly, a position he still holds.

* According to a Party ruling adopted on April 19, 1954, a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee cannot also hold a government position. Politburo members holding government positions include: Stoica, Premier; Bodnarus, Borila, Constantinescu, and Moghioros, First Deputy Premiers; Leontin Salajan and Stefan Voitec, now both alternate Politburo Members, are Minister of the Armed Forces and Minister of Internal Trade respectively.

Iosif Chisinevski



Standard Regime Photo

Sept. 1947—Delegate at inception of Cominform in Poland.

Feb. 1948—Member of the Presidium of the Party's Congress. Re-elected Secretary-General, a position abolished in autumn 1953, when he was elected First Secretary.

Apr. 1948-Jun. 52—First Deputy Premier.

Jun. 1948—Delegate to the Cominform meeting at which Yugoslavia was expelled.

Jun. 1952-Oct. 55—Premier.

Apr. 1954—Resigned as First Secretary of the RW[C]P.

Oct. 1955—Elected First Secretary, resigned as Premier.

Chivu Stoica

Born in 1910 in Smeieni, Buzau District, Stoica, who has been Premier since October 2, 1955, and a member of the Politburo since 1945, is a close political associate of Gheorghiu-Dej. Like Dej, he is believed to have been a member of the Peasant Party in his youth and he helped him organize the Grivita strike. He is of peasant stock and has had only an elementary school education. He has been married twice and has one daughter.

1925?—Worked for railroad and metallurgical factories.

1930—Joined the CPR.

1933-44—Arrested and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for his part in the Grivita strike. Held at Ocnele Mari, Aiud, Doftana and Targu-Jiu until August 23, 1944.

Gheorghe Apostol



Romanian News (Washington), May 14, 1950

- 1944—Helped organize the General Confederation of Labor and the National Democratic Front.
- 1945 to date—Member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the CPR.
- 1945-?—Member of the Party's Control Committee.
- 1946—General Manager of the Romanian Railways Administration.
- 1946 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly.
- 1948—Member of the Presidium of the RW[C]P Congress. Minister of Industry.
- 1949-53—Minister of Metallurgical and Chemical Industries.
- 1950-54—Deputy Premier, Orgburo Member (Orgburo abolished 1954).
- 1953-Oct. 55—Minister of Metallurgical and Machine Building Industries.
- 1954-Oct. 55—First Deputy Premier.
- Oct. 1955 to date—Premier.

Iosif Chisinevski

Born in 1905 in Balti, Bessarabia, Chisinevski has been a Politburo Member since 1948. He is Jewish by birth and his family name is Broitman. He is the son of impoverished parents but completed secondary school, and speaks fluent Russian, German and some French. He is a small man, reputedly hot-tempered and a heavy drinker. His first wife died; he remarried and has one child.

- 1928—Joined the CPR.
- 1930-36—Arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment, he was released in 1932. Re-arrested in 1933, he was released for a second time in 1936.
- 1936-41—Member of the (illegal) General Council of United Syndicates; reportedly spent considerable time in Moscow. He was arrested in 1941 and sentenced to 25 years at hard labor. He was released in August 1944.

- Oct. 1945-Oct. 48—Chairman of the Agitprop Commission.
- 1946 to date—Member of the Managing Board of *Scinteia*.
- 1948—Member of the Presidium and Resolutions Committee of the RW[C]P Congress; elected to the Central Committee.
- 1948 to date—Member of the Politburo.
- Oct. 1948-Apr. 54—Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, substituted as Secretary-General for Dej in autumn 1948.
- Mar. 1950-Oct. 55—Deputy Premier. Again appointed member of the Secretariat of the CC.
- Dec. 1955—Awarded the title of "Hero of Socialist Labor."

Gheorghe Apostol

Born in 1912 in Tudor Vladimirescu, Tecuci District, Apostol belonged to the Peasant and Social-Democratic Parties before he joined the CPR. He is the son of a railway worker and attended a trade school for railroad workers in the years 1927-31. Up to 1948, his Party work was almost exclusively devoted to labor questions; since then he has had comparatively wide experience in the State and Party apparatus.

- 1934-44—Joined the CPR, was arrested in 1934 and released the same year; President of the Democratic Youth Bloc (a front group) in 1936; arrested and sentenced to prison, probably that year, he was released shortly before the August 1944 coup.
- 1944—One of the two Secretaries on Commission set up to organize the General Confederation of Labor.
- 1944-53—President of the General Confederation of Labor.
- 1945 to date—Deputy member and member of the Executive Committee of the General Council of the WFTU.
- 1946—Delegate to WFTU meeting in Moscow.
- 1946 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly.
- 1947—Attended Belgrade meeting of Balkan labor leaders.
- 1948 to date—Member of the Politburo.
- 1948—Member of the Presidium of the RW[C]P Congress; member of the Commission for Simplification and Rationalization of the State Apparatus.
- 1949—Member of the State Commission for Implementation of the People's Council Laws; delegate to the 10th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions; member of the Presidium of the RPR Congress of Intellectuals for Peace and Culture.
- 1950-54—Member of Orgburo (Orgburo dissolved in 1954).
- 1950 to date—Member of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Front.
- 1952-54—Deputy Premier.
- 1953-54—Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (to April, 1954).

1954-55—First Secretary of the Party from April 1954 to October 2, 1955, when he relinquished this post to Dej and assumed leadership of the Trade Unions.

Alexandru Moghioros

Born in 1914 near Brasov of Hungarian stock, Moghioros is one of the youngest leaders in the top Party echelon and, because he has shown himself to be both ruthless and hard working, he is expected to rise to the very highest posts. He has had some secondary education (he may have completed the "gymnasium") and contributes articles to various Party journals.

1932-33—Joined the Union of Communist Youth, was later on its Central Committee.

1933-44—Left the UCY to become special assistant to Ana Pauker in reorganizing the Party. Arrested in 1934 for involvement in the Grivita strike, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He contracted TB and was released after the 1944 coup.

1945—Active in organizing trade unions.

1945 to date—Member of the Central Committee.

1948-54—Member of the Secretariat of the RW[C]P.

1948 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly; Member of the Presidium of the Assembly; Member of the Politburo.

1949—Romanian delegate to the Cominform meeting in Hungary.

1949 to date—In charge of organizational planning for handling of compulsory deliveries and collections—October 1949; named President (with Ministerial rank) of State Committee for Collection of Agricultural Products—1950-51; following Pauker's purge in 1952, designated Central Committee member in charge of agricultural affairs, a position he still holds.

1950-54—Member of Orgburo (Orgburo dissolved in 1954).

1952—Took over Vasile Luca's Regional Party Organization until it was purged of the former leader's followers.

1954—Deputy Premier—April-August.

Aug. 1954 to date—First Deputy Premier.

Emil Bodnaras

Bodnaras was born on February 10, 1904 in Iaslovat, Bucovina, of working-class parents. He attended Iasi University and, in the period 1928-30, an Advanced Artillery School. He also apparently studied at an artillery school in Italy and is known to be fluent in Russian, besides having some knowledge of German, French and Italian. He is brilliant, witty and strongly pro-Moscow. His Party career has been one steady, stable rise.

1927-44—Commissioned Second Lieutenant in the Romanian Army in 1927; assigned to the 12th Artillery Regiment, Bucovina, in 1930; joined the Communist Party and defected to the USSR with secret military documents in 1932; was tried *in absentia*, returned secretly on a Party mission, was caught, retried and imprisoned in 1933; escaped to the Soviet Union, became a Soviet citizen and attended NKVD schools in 1936. Returned clandestinely to Romania before August 1944, helped re-establish the CPR, and set up partisan units.

1944 to date—Member of the Central Committee.

1945-47—Special Assistant to the Premier and Chief of the Council of Ministers' Political Information Service.

1946 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly.

1947—Member of the Ministerial Commission for the Execution of the Peace Treaty.

1947-55—Minister of the Armed Forces (formerly National Defense) until October 1955. (Was made full General in October 1951).

1948—Member of the Presidium of the RW[C]P Congress.

1948 to date—Member of the Politburo.

Oct. 1955 to date—First Deputy Premier.

Miron Constantinescu

Constantinescu was born in Buzau in 1917. He is of middle-class origin and one of the best-educated leaders in the Party. He holds a B.A. (*cum laude*) from Bucharest University and received his Doctorate in 1940. He is fluent in French. After 1945 he was reportedly head of the Political Information Section of the Central Committee and charged with "surveillance" of non-Communist organizations.

1945-?—Secretary of the Journalists' Trade Unions; Managing Editor of *Scinteia*.

1945 to date—Member of the Central Committee.

1946 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly (Vice President of its Foreign Affairs Committee until 1948).

1947-1949—General Secretary of the Interdepartmental Commission for Economic Recovery and Monetary Stabilization.

1948-Apr. 1949—Minister of Mining and Petroleum.

1948 to date—Member of the Politburo; Professor of Economics at Bucharest University.

1949-Oct. 1955—President of the State Planning Commission.

1951—Delegate to the Hungarian Workers' [Communist] Party Congress.

1951-Oct. 55—Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Oct. 1955 to date—First Deputy Premier.

Petru Borila

Son of a laborer, Borila was born in Bessarabia in 1905. He is one of the few present Party leaders who has been connected with the CPR since its earliest days. He began to work in a brick factory in 1919. In later years he spent much time abroad and reportedly graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union. He speaks both Russian and Spanish.

1921-44—Joined the Communist Youth Union in 1921; joined the CPR; was sent with a military unit to put down peasant uprisings in Bessarabia in 1924 and defected to the USSR; remained in the Soviet Union (and possibly the Far East) until 1936. Was a Battalion Commander in the International Brigade in Spain 1936-39; returned to the USSR in 1940. Was Second in Command of the Political and Educational Section of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division in 1943; returned home and left army in 1944.

1944-47—Head of the Party organization for Bucharest.

1944 to date—Member of the Central Committee.

1948-49—Recalled to active duty in the Romanian Army, promoted to Lieutenant-General and made Chief of the Superior Political Directorate of the Army.

1948 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly.

1949-50—Deputy Minister of National Defense (later renamed Armed Forces).

1950-51—Minister of Construction.

1951-53—President of the State Control Commission.

1953-55—Minister of the Food Industry.

Apr. 1954—Appointed Deputy Premier.

Oct. 1955 to date—First Deputy Premier.

Constantin Parvulescu

Parvulescu was born in Olanesti, Oltenia, in 1895 one of seven sons of a laborer. He attended high school but apparently did not graduate. He worked in Bucharest in his youth and displayed an interest in the Social-Democratic Party as early as 1912 by attending lectures. He associated himself with the Maximalist faction (forerunners of the Communist Party) in 1919. As an old, militant Party member, he has played a major role in the Party's organization since the war, chiefly as Chairman of the Control Commission. This position includes the judgment of deviations and infractions by Party members, so that he presumably had a major say in the Patrascanu and Pauker purges.

1921-44—Founding member of the CPR, went into hiding in 1921. He was elected a member of the Central Committee in 1929. Arrested and imprisoned in

1934, he apparently managed to carry out Party functions from prison. He either escaped or was released in 1938 and spent most of the war in Moscow.

1945 to date—Chairman of the Control Commission.

1946 to date—Deputy to the National Assembly.

1948—Member of the Credentials Committee and Presidium of the RW[C]P Congress.

1949 to date—Member of the Presidium of the National Assembly.

1951 to date—Director of the Institute of Party History.

1953 to date—Chairman of the National Assembly.

Alexandru Draghici

Born in 1913 in Buzau, Muntenia.

1944—Active in Communist Youth Union.

1945—Prosecutor of "People's Tribunal" at trial of "War Criminals." Alternate Member of the Central Committee.

1946—Deputy to the National Assembly.

1947—Member of the Youth Commission of the Central Committee.

1948—Secretary of the Party's Bucharest City Organization.

1950—Deputy Minister of the Interior.

1952—Minister of the Interior; listed as Major-General.

Sept. 1952-Oct. 53—Minister of State Security.

Oct. 1953 to date—Minister of Internal Affairs.

Apr. 1954—Elected Alternate Member of the Politburo.

Dec. 1955—Elected full Member of the Politburo. (Now holds rank of Col.-Gen.).

Nicolae Ceausescu

Born in 1918 in Scornicesti, Ilt District, the son of a poor peasant.

1945—Secretary of the Bucharest Party organization; Member of the Central Committee (of the CPR).

1946—Elected Deputy to the National Assembly.

1948—Alternate member of the Central Committee (of the RW[C]P).

Mar. 1949-Mar. 1950—Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

Mar. 1950-54—Deputy Minister of Armed Forces with rank of Major-General.

1951-53—Chief of the Superior Political Directorate of the Army. (Promoted to Lieutenant-General in 1952).

1954—Secretary of the Central Committee and alternate Member of the Politburo.

1955 to date—Full Member of the Politburo.

Poland

Revisited

A summary of observations made by Irena Penzik, who was born in Poland and came to the US in 1939. As the niece of Polish UN representative Katz-Suchy and an employee at the Polish UN delegation, she had the opportunity to see the intimate workings of the Communist bureaucracy. The following is based on a portion of her book, *People's Representatives*, now in preparation.

"To understand why I created a veritable sensation wherever I went, it was enough to look closely at my colleagues, my countrymen and women, in shabby clothing which often constituted their entire wardrobe. I saw men at the Foreign Ministry wearing shoes without socks in late autumn and winter. . . . Day after day, I saw the women coming to work in the same skimpy, lightweight dresses which were often dirty and full of holes. They did not even attempt to make themselves presentable. Most of them barely combed their hair—they looked drab, unwashed and old long before their time. I ceased wondering at this when I discovered the drudgery of their daily lives, the unavailability of bathrooms, soap, clothes, foundation garments, cosmetics and cleaning establishments. In this unequal struggle, the women of Poland seemed to have given up."

SIX WEEKS of home leave in 1951-52 gave Irena Penzik her first look at postwar Poland, a glimpse of drabness, drudgery and resignation which came as a profound shock. Before her visit, she had imagined Poland to be a nation invigorated by the building of a new and just "Socialist" society, and she had magnified "capitalist" injustices in the US, judging the entire fabric of American life in the light of this distortion. The injustices of prewar Poland were also vivid in her memory, as well as the persecutions suffered by her Communist uncle Juliusz Katz-Suchy and her Socialist father. In 1945, the year her father died, she married an American Communist who shared her political beliefs, and in 1946, she obtained employment as a secretary with the Polish UN delegation through her father's friend Oscar Lange who at that time was Polish Ambassador to



Caption to this picture showing man with unpacked loaf of bread under his arm reads: "The town stores are well supplied."

Swiat (Warsaw), October 23, 1955

the US and a UN representative. Later that year, her uncle, Katz-Suchy, arrived in the US as a member of the Polish UN delegation of which he subsequently became chief.

From 1946 until 1951, she believed almost everything she read in the Communist newspapers, everything she heard from Katz-Suchy and his colleagues about the utopia being created in the country of her birth. She knew that economic conditions in Poland were far from perfect, but she imagined the atmosphere to be charged with vigor and belief. When finally she was granted leave to see this new world, her illusions were swiftly destroyed: instead of enthusiasm, equal opportunity and equal distribution, she found conditions worse than before the war. In the new "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Polish people were sadder, poorer, hungrier and with less hope than ever before.

Unlike her fellow workers stationed comfortably abroad, she was unable to accept the Polish reality complacently or to rationalize what she saw as "a necessary, temporary evil." Katz-Suchy explained to her that "you have to pay for Socialism"; later, she was accused of being "short on Marxist theory" because she was unable to accept the "necessity" for such extreme and protracted payment. Her opinion of the "People's Democracy" was based on the life she saw

about her, and her conclusions were simple and to the point. Production, she knew, had attained and exceeded prewar levels, yet the average citizen led an intolerable existence and his everyday needs were a matter of indifference to the State. Shops were empty—even shoelaces and buttons were hard to find; hospitals were overcrowded and unsanitary, and arranging for a doctor to come to your home was a matter of privilege or friendship; food was scarce and obtainable only after long hours of waiting on line; housing accommodations were far below requirements, and heating was virtually non-existent although Poland was one of the largest coal producing countries in the world.

The "cultural revival" and the new group of "worker-intellectuals" so widely hailed by the Party press did not exist. On the contrary, life for most people was primarily a struggle for survival against unequal odds: their energies were expended on trying to make ends meet, on scraping together food and clothing, coping with the acute transportation problem, and finding ways to make life half bearable. The prevailing mood of Warsaw citizens was one of fatigue, and instead of discovering a country at a higher stage of civilization, she found that the "brutalization" of existence which had characterized the occupation period had continued into the Communist present.

What struck her most forcibly, aside from the deplorable inconveniences and hardships of daily existence, was the privileged position of Party elite and the necessity to have pull and patronage to survive. "Favored personages" were granted private cars to take them to and from work and anywhere they wanted to go; they were allocated choice apartments, permitted to buy food in special stores with special ration cards, and allowed to ignore the labor discipline so harshly imposed on the rest of the people. Only with the help of influential officials could an ordinary person find a room in a hotel or escape from the chaos of bureaucratic red tape prevailing in government departments. But even the new elite felt the general poverty, and its greatest ambition was to be sent and to remain abroad.

Her first impressions of Poland convinced her that concentration on the petty but all important details of existence affected both high and low. Thus her friend from the Foreign Ministry, Kalinowska, was inconsolable when she returned from Geneva to find that in her absence her small but precious supply of American instant coffee had been virtually used up. Not only was coffee hunger acute, but at that time there was hardly any milk or meat, and butter was a rare luxury. Even in the privileged Katz-Suchy household, chicken was served only once during her stay and had been purchased by the housekeeper on the open market for the prohibitive price of 180 *zlotys*. "I asked the housekeeper, who lived on the outside and had a family of her own, how she could possibly get along with such food prices. She replied: 'We eat *kluski* [noodles] mostly, kasha and potatoes. One lives.'"

Soon she grew accustomed to seeing lines of poorly dressed women standing in the cold for hours in quest of food. One day, passing a small grocery, she was stopped by an excited passerby, her face radiant under her shawl:



Workers having a glass of beer on Saturday before their departure from Nowa Huta to their native villages.

Swiat (Warsaw), October 23, 1955

"They're selling herring," the woman shouted. "They're selling herring!" At this unexpected discovery, the stranger was unable to contain her joy.

Even when food was obtainable, the quality of products was generally poor. One evening her uncle Katz-Suchy brought home a box of E. Wedel chocolates. This confection had been famous in prewar Poland, and was now being produced under the same brand name by a State-owned factory. Her delight with this reminder of the past, however, vanished on the first taste: the candy was chalky and had nothing in common with the E. Wedel chocolate she had known as a child. "I saw no reason for the bad quality of the product," she remarks, "except that there no longer seemed to be any pride involved in the making of it. This kind of carelessness was evident in the appearance and quality of other goods destined for public consumption, as well as in the dirty, ill-kept interiors of stores, offices and halls of many apartment houses. No one seemed to care about the appearance of things. Life in Warsaw seemed utterly devoid of beauty, though much could have been achieved with little effort. Except for special occasions, the will to remedy this situation was non-existent."

Carelessness was evident not only in consumer products and personal appearance but in the city of Warsaw itself, despite the fact that much planning, effort and sacrifice had gone into reconstruction, and the newly-built structures were a source of great civic pride. To reconstruct the

ruined city, the population had worked on Sundays and during free hours, yet at the same time many new buildings were allowed to deteriorate in a remarkably rapid fashion. The new department store on Bracka Street was indicative of the prevailing negligence. When the store had been opened, six months before her arrival, all of Warsaw had come to ride on the escalator, the second ever built in the city. Within a short time, however, the escalator had stopped working, and from all indications it was destined to remain in disrepair. Furthermore, no effort was made to keep the premises clean. "The most shocking aspect of the building was the appearance of the stairway used for reaching the street. I can hardly describe the filth and pollution of this area. . . . The lack of respect for or identification with the structure was both obvious and discouraging."

Although the Bracka Street store featured window displays of pots and pans and electric irons, these products were unavailable inside and, as in most stores, there were very few consumer goods in stock. Visiting the main shopping district on Nowy Swiat, she found that the stores featured some very expensive fabrics, a few primitively handmade articles of clothing at high prices and some "uncommonly ugly women's shoes," which surprised her, because Warsaw shoemakers had once been known throughout Europe for mastery of their craft. She found only one good clothing store for women. It specialized in knitted goods, custom-made sweaters and suits which sold for 450 *zlotys* and a minimum of 4,000 *zlotys* respectively—prices which were far beyond the reach of almost everyone. "The only woman in Poland I actually saw wearing a suit from the store was the Vice-Minister of Education, Zofia Dembinska. Despite the exorbitant prices, however, the store was always crowded, perhaps because it was the only one of its kind."

The average citizen often wore the same outfit day after day, and since cleaning took a long time, most people walked about in soiled clothes and the ill-kempt person was not the exception but the norm. Complaining to her friend Kalinowska about the slowness and inefficiency of the dry-cleaning service, she received the following reply: "You Americans, the moment you see a spot on your clothes, you rush to the cleaners." Nobody but foreigners and the wives of diplomats who had just returned from abroad seemed perturbed about this state of affairs.

Entertainment in Warsaw was no more inspiring than shopping. The scant film fare consisted of Polish, Soviet and East European movies, most of them slow-moving, primitive productions, with easily predictable endings and monotonous political propaganda. Her enjoyment was further impaired because the poor ventilation and the shortages of soap and bathing facilities throughout Warsaw made the air in movie houses unbearable after the first performance. Occasionally, she attended an evening lecture or play, but the discomfort of having to wait as long as one or two hours in the cold late at night for transportation home discouraged her from going out often. The other inhabitants of the city seemed to have the same reaction, for she noticed that Warsaw streets were nearly deserted in the evenings. "The crowded condition of the-



Woman taking her child to creche before going to work.

Swiat (Warsaw), October 23, 1955

atres and movie houses was due to the fact that only a few existed in the city, rather than to the high frequency of public attendance."

The joylessness and insecurity of life in Poland depressed her considerably and was reflected in the attitudes of many people she met. The mother of a Polish diplomat abroad came to visit her in order to pick up a gift from her son. Upon her arrival, the woman looked suspiciously at the four walls of Miss Penzik's hotel room and then said in a whisper that the last time her son was on home leave she had hoped and prayed he would be able to get out of the country again. Regardless of her own personal sacrifice, the woman would have been happy not to see her son ever again.

That conditions within the country tended to destroy rather than foster family life was also indicated to her during a visit to Bierutowice, the rest home for Foreign Office employees. The abundance of food there was in sharp contrast to the scarcities she had observed elsewhere, and in the course of conversations with a waitress and the director of the rest home, she learned that they considered themselves exceptionally fortunate to have obtained their positions. The waitress was married to an army officer and had a child whom she had left in the care of her mother. Despite her husband's requests, she refused to take the baby and join him in the town where he was stationed. She explained that she couldn't face the idea of having to struggle for every bit of food. "While I'm here," she said, "I'm sure of three square meals a day."

Many people she met grumbled about conditions, and here and there she noticed signs of acute resentment of the regime. While riding in a taxi one day with her friend Helenka S. she was informed that the renovated Party building they were passing was a prewar structure. "This wing," her friend pointed out, "was added after the war and doesn't go with the rest. I don't know in exactly what style it's been built." The taxi driver, who had been listening had no doubts on this score. "In the Socialist style, of course," he said sneeringly. Both she and her friend sat in embarrassed silence. She noticed too that a new Party building in the process of construction was surrounded by armed militiamen with fixed bayonets. She surmised that this precaution was to protect the building from vandalism and other manifestations of popular resentment.

In general, however, she found that Communist propaganda had had a strong effect both on intellectuals and workers. Wherever she went, she found people ignorant of conditions in the West and with warped views of American life. On a visit to Cracow, she met an old family friend, an eminent scientist, who was living in deplorable conditions due to his lack of influence in Party circles. Although he resented his position very much, he wholeheartedly believed the tales of American poverty and political persecution he read in the Party press. Similarly, Kalinowska's housekeeper, who was no particular adherent of Communist ideology, asked her one day: "Why do Americans want war with us? . . . I don't care how much harder life gets, I don't want another war. I'll be satisfied with everything if only that doesn't happen." Katz-Suchy's housekeeper in-



Caption reads: "The Nowa Huta girls do not forget to buy flowers."

Swiat (Warsaw), October 23, 1955

quired one day: "Is life in America as hard as it is here?" The underlying assumption, Miss Penzik felt, was that life must be hard everywhere and that conditions were the same all over, except for small variations in degree.

Although many of her acquaintances in the diplomatic set had lived abroad for long periods of time, they were always careful to disavow any connections with or admiration for life in the West. She noticed that Katz-Suchy was anxious to persuade his relatives living in the US to return to Poland, because his reputation might suffer otherwise. Once, during her stay in Poland, she was invited to attend an official reception by old friends of her father who, although they had high official posts, were not Communists. When Katz-Suchy learned about it, he exclaimed: "You just came from America. This is all you need." Similarly, her friend Kalinowska invited her to stay at her apartment when she arrived in Warsaw. But she added: "I don't want any mail from America coming to this address."

Even the famous poet Tuwim, who died in 1953, was obliged to conform. Suffering from a nervous disease and in bed most of the time, Tuwim asked her to have some friends of his in New York send him copies of *The New Yorker* once in a while. Then he turned to Katz-Suchy, who had accompanied her on the visit, and asked: "Do you think it would be all right for me to write to Artur Rubinstein now? I know he is an enemy of ours, but . . ."

"No, I don't think you'd better," Katz-Suchy said.

Even though Rubinstein had been more than generous to Tuwim and his wife when they had arrived penniless in New York during the war, the poet bowed his head to Katz-Suchy's edict.

Rejection and distortion of everything connected with the United States formed part of basic Party policy. While she was in Warsaw, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored an exhibit of American war toys. To Miss Penzik,

the exhibit seemed blatantly unfair, since she knew from experience the amount and variety of fine educational toys produced in the US. "This knowledge," she said, "was carefully kept from my countrymen, however, since they suffered from a complete lack of comparable products."

Her aunt Lilka (Katz-Suchy's wife, a physician) told of the misery she witnessed daily at the creche where she worked. Because of poor heating and food and clothing shortages, many of the children were wracked with disease: "At first Lilka had quite a problem introducing into her work American authorities on child care . . . for only Soviet medicine was considered an acceptable model. She had brought along with her from the US many medical textbooks and instruments and medicines, and was using them, despite the hostility she constantly encountered."

Another aspect of life which thoroughly disconcerted her was the feeling of being spied on. This feeling overcame her as soon as she set foot in the country. On her arrival at the Warsaw airport, her original enthusiasm was quenched when she found herself being subjected to rigid control and harsh treatment by militiamen and customs officials. She was shocked when her nylon stockings, lipsticks and extra handbag were confiscated and her private letters and books exposed to scrupulous examination. Her uneasiness increased when she found that she had run a great risk by failing to declare in advance a small amount of Polish currency she carried in her purse. She realized almost at once that only her relationship to Katz-Suchy had saved her from serious trouble. Later on, she found Katz-Suchy's help indispensable in getting a hotel room and in retrieving her papers from the Ministry of Internal Security. This so affected her that during her last days in Poland she was in a state of cold fear when she imagined that she might be prevented from leaving the country.



Women in Warsaw.

Swiat (Warsaw), July 24, 1955

Gradually she came to feel strange in her own country and learned to watch her step. On a visit to Cracow, she had asked an acquaintance about seeing the new giant steel center, Nowa Huta, which was being built nearby. He discouraged her from attempting to go. Special permission was needed from higher Party officials and her acquaintance apparently did not want to be put on the spot by making such a request for a comparative stranger, however well-recommended. When she subsequently expressed her regrets to one of her Ministry friends in Warsaw, she received the following reply: "Why do you need to be bothered going there? They'll call you an American spy and you'll get yourself into trouble."

Another friend informed her about the system of censoring foreign mail. He explained that no mail was ever stopped, but that photostatic copies of each letter were made for future reference. By this method, he explained proudly, two birds were killed with one stone—the outside world was led to think that censorship did not exist, and the security forces inside the country were able to gather documentary evidence of "disloyalty."

Her visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intensified her sense of insecurity. The first day, she was accompanied by her aunt:

"We went through the side door . . . since the center door was meant only for the highest ranking officials, such as the Minister or Vice-Minister or foreign diplomats. We found ourselves in a small entrance hall, part of which was screened off by a glass partition. Behind the partition sat several officials, whose job was to issue or refuse passes into the building. None of them appeared to have been schooled in the rudiments of politeness. It was not until Lilka had a furious and involved argument with two of the officials and several phone calls were made to important personages inside the building that we were permitted passes. These passes had to be marked with the exact time of entry and the name of the official one was to see. Upon leaving that person's office, the pass had to be signed by the official and the exact time of departure indicated. . . ."

Once upstairs the confusion increased. The Ministry contained no central information office and she found the chaos and lack of coordination fantastic. Finding the official who might solve your particular problem was a question of luck. The Ministry was divided into various departments, but this division, as well as the whole structure of organization, was a secret. Even employees of the Ministry had no idea what their colleagues in the next room were doing. In view of this, Katz-Suchy's help was indispensable. "I feel certain," Miss Penzik said, "that had it not been for my relationship to him, I might still be wandering about those same halls, a lonely and forgotten figure."

Members of Polish missions abroad had exorbitant salaries, and in view of the harsh living conditions in Poland, went on extensive shopping tours prior to their return home. When Katz-Suchy was recalled to Poland, he bought canned goods, clothing of every sort, soap, toilet paper, furniture, bedding, drugs, cosmetics, electrical appliances—including a washing machine, a refrigerator, and an electric sewing machine—as well as leather and textile goods



Workers returning home from Lenin Factory at Nowa Huta.

Swiat (Warsaw), October 23, 1955

of all sorts. "Although returning to the land of plenty, which was always the way he described Poland, he certainly equipped himself and his family as if he were leaving civilization forever."

Katz-Suchy's Warsaw apartment was furnished almost exclusively with imports:

"The door of the apartment was secured by several heavy locks as well as an iron bar. Warsaw had a poor reputation for honesty dating from the lawless days right after World War II, when it was almost impossible to walk down its dark streets without being robbed. . . . The children's room was bright and large, filled with American books, clothes and toys. Even their beds had come from the United States. The dining room was the utmost in luxury in this city of terrific housing shortages, and was furnished with expensive modern furniture shipped directly from . . . New York. In contrast, the housekeeper's room was a small cubby-hole and was poorly furnished.

"There were two bathrooms in the apartment equipped with American fixtures and utensils down to the smallest possible detail. Thus a medicine cabinet, an unheard of luxury in today's Poland, had been installed. There was an elegant toilet seat instead of the usual unpainted wood seen everywhere in Warsaw, there were towel racks, a soap holder and hamper, American tissues, soft toilet paper, American toothpaste, heavy towels, as well as cosmetic aids of all kinds."

Most of the diplomats abroad hated having to return to Poland, and to avoid this eventuality, they adopted the technique of complaining constantly about the difficulties of life in foreign lands. To complete the picture, they made frequent requests for recall. By this method, they

convinced the Warsaw government of their loyalty and dedication and increased their chances of remaining outside their native land. One friend of Miss Penzik explained: "I was assigned to Rome. So they asked me, how do you like it here? I said, truthfully, very much. And they recalled me in no time at all."

Another acquaintance she met during her stay asked her: "Are conditions as bad for our staff in the US as they say they are?" Miss Penzik replied that on the contrary, they were for the most part excellent. Another colleague piped up: "What did I tell you? I knew all along those sons of guns were lying."

Her friend Kalinowska kept complaining that she was too ill and too busy writing a book to attend the forthcoming General Assembly session in Paris. When Kalinowska was suddenly hospitalized before the session, Miss Penzik remarked to Katz-Suchy and Birecki (who took over Katz-Suchy's post as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative to the UN) that she would be very glad to have escaped the unpleasant chore. Both of them laughed. "She doesn't mean a word of it," Birecki said. "That's an old ruse. She's dying to go." Later Kalinowska quarreled with Birecki on the subject. "She was deeply offended when he called her a hypocrite."

Although hypocrisy and opportunism were common among the diplomatic personnel, their desire to remain abroad was primarily a desire for personal comfort and did not constitute any weakness in their Communist convictions. They continued to spin tales of the remarkable progress and well-being in the "People's Democracies," and to speak with real conviction, "for to admit even to

Summer 1955: A Visitor in Warsaw

Recent Refugee Report

"I had not been to Warsaw since 1940. I found the atmosphere depressing. People looked unhappy and were badly dressed. Riding on streetcars was a nightmare. They were overflowing with passengers and it was impossible to push one's way in. . . . The cultural level of Polish workers and farmers has improved a good deal since prewar days, but most people I met complained about how hard it was to make ends meet. There is a good deal of pilfering and outright stealing to supplement incomes. . . .

"The women in the house where I stayed had to get up at 5:30 in the morning to get on the lines in front of the butcher. It was often eleven before they got into the shop. Some people even appeared at the stores at four in the morning. As the first in line when the store opened, they bought extra meat and then sold it to others who had no time to wait. There are people who make a business of standing in lines; they get paid for doing it for others.

... "A woman friend of mine went shopping for a pair of shoes. She was unable to find a pair in her size . . . in any

of the State stores. She had to go to some small, private shops that still exist in Chmielna Street. She was still unable to find her size, so she had to order a pair of custom-made patent leather shoes. The cost was 1,500 zlotys.

"One day I broke an electric bulb in the home where I was staying. The family had to wait three months before they could get a new one. . . .

"Many Poles receive money from relatives living abroad—mostly in the United States. They get a document from the *Narodowy Bank Polski* allowing them to buy goods for the amount sent from abroad. Armed with this document, a Pole can buy better quality goods, usually reserved for export. People often buy certain articles and then sell them, in this way supplementing their income.

"There is a free market in the Warsaw suburb of Praga, where even the scarcest items are available. Merchants pay a special tax on things they sell and are licensed by the authorities. . . . Penicillin, rarely obtainable in pharmacies, can be bought here as well as precious wristwatches."

themselves that their nobly conceived experiment had proved a failure would have been for many of them a form of intellectual suicide." In this respect, she considered Katz-Suchy to be unusual, and discovered that his conduct was considered slightly undisciplined. Although at times he would extol the virtues and progress of "Socialist" Poland, at other times his caustic humor gave the lie to his praise. One of his favorite jokes was about a Mr. N. meeting a Mr. Z. and asking: "Since you are a great Marxist theoretician, I wonder if you could answer a question. Do we have Socialism already or is it still going to get worse?"


Katz-Suchy, like all the others, maintained a perennial blindness to the misery and poverty of Polish life, and by

the time she left Poland Miss Penzik realized that her colleagues had lost all sensitivity to the plight of the common people and were concerned chiefly with maintaining their own privileged positions. The shock of her visit affected her deeply and the difficulties she had encountered personally as well as the things she had seen precipitated her break with her uncle and the present regime. To her eyes, the Communist government had done nothing to alleviate or improve the lot of the common man; on the contrary, conditions had deteriorated, and the Party which chose to feed people on propaganda instead of food had lost any justification for existence.

Security Leak

A Polish seaman told the following story concerning the Polish ship "Pilica." In the summer of 1954, the ship arrived in Hamburg harbor to have her echo-sound system repaired. A German technician, called in to make the repairs, asked for the blueprint of the sound system. The Poles replied that the blueprint could not be shown to him since it was considered secret. "All right," answered the German, "if it's secret to you, that's that; but the system was devised by L. M. Ericsson Ltd., in Stockholm. I'll just ring them up." He did so, and the blueprint arrived by mail the next day.

Eyewitness



Reports...

This section presents current information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain from refugees interviewed by Radio Free Europe reporters.

IN ORDER NOT to be outdone by Prague where, in 1912, the Fourth Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party headed by Lenin took place, and where the house in which that conference was held is a museum, the Polish Communist regime decided that a Lenin Museum should be established in Warsaw, in addition to the one already at Poronin.

On April 21, 1955, the opening of the Central Lenin Museum in Warsaw took place. In connection with this, an informed source inside Poland commented that the name "Central Museum" is well grounded. There are in Poland five places where Lenin lived during his stay in the country, namely: a. A house in Flisacka Street in Zwierzyniec in Cracow—no longer in existence; b. House No. 51 in Lubomirski Street in Cracow; c. A house on the border of Poronin and Bialy Dunaj, where Lenin spent one of his vacations; d. The house of Pawel Gut Mostowy in Poronin, where conversations between Lenin and various revolutionists took place; e. A prison cell in Nowy Targ, where Lenin was detained for a few days in August, 1914.

According to the informant, there was not a trace left of Lenin's occupancy in any of these places. In order to create the necessary legend for propaganda purposes, everything was "reconstructed." First of all, a kind of mausoleum was built in Poronin. The "Leninist" part of Poronin, with a monument of Lenin erected in the park established around the house of Gut Mostowy, was opened to the public in 1948.

Subsequently, it became almost a civic duty for every Pole to make at least one visit to Poronin. The authorities have an easy way of checking this: when a visitor enters the Poronin Museum, the guard glues on his Party membership card, on his Trade Union card, or on some other identity card, the so-called "Leninist stamp." It is a small red stamp bearing Stalin's profile; at the bottom, the numeral indicating the visit number is printed. It is reliably estimated that by May 1955 more than nine million Poles

had visited the Poronin Museum, which, since it has been operating for eight years, would put the annual rate of visitors at over one million. As in all other fields, there are a number of "Stakhanovite" visitors who are able to show dozens of "Leninist stamps" affixed to their identity cards. The stamp costs one *zloty* (25 cents).

The expense of turning the houses and their surroundings into a museum, and of turning the prison in Nowy Targ into Lenin Scout House, are believed to have exceeded 3.5 million *zlotys*. In addition, there are the costs of maintenance, salaries of museum personnel, guides, interpreters, etc. On the occasion of the opening of the Central Museum in Warsaw, it was revealed that the total personnel employed in Lenin museums in Poland amounts to 617 persons.

However, the profit (which would be about 9 million *zlotys*) realized from the sale of the stamps was not used for maintenance but for building the Central Museum in Warsaw. The funds for maintenance of the Lenin museums do not come from the Polish Communist Party, nor from the Soviet Embassy. They are collected as "voluntary" donations from the Polish working people.

A FORMER STUDENT NURSE from Czechoslovakia outlined the rules and practices followed in the treatment of patients. A patient is entitled to free treatment only at his designated Health Center. Private farmers and businessmen, she believed, do not receive free medical care. In order to be declared ill (and excused from work), a patient must have a temperature of at least 99.1 degrees. She further stated that only those patients who pay their regular monthly social insurance fees may be sent to a spa. All patients who cannot move without help—such as bad cases of rheumatism—are excluded from spas. Pregnant women receive 18 weeks leave, nine of which may be taken prior to the birth. A pregnant woman receives 100 *koruny*

toward a layette and 500 *koruny* to cover the expenses of the childbirth. The registration of all women from the beginning of pregnancy is designed to prevent the practice of abortion.

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A TECHNICIAN RECENTLY repatriated to West Germany after spending ten years in a Czechoslovak prison stated that the best technical skill in Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovak or German, is "behind bars" in Prague and Opava, in the three technical drafting departments located in Pankrac and Opava prisons.

These prison departments are supplied with modern drafting and calculating equipment, and create plans for much of Czechoslovak industry and construction. The prisoners receive the same salaries paid outside for the same work. Technical magazines and journals, brought in by civilian employees from the industries, circulate freely among the prisoners. They include technical publications from the entire world, both Communist and non-Communist, including America, England, Switzerland, France and West Germany. As of June 1955, prisoners were allowed to subscribe to any technical publication anywhere in the world, at their own expense.

The technical drafting department in Pankrac prison, directly controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, is charged with drawing up plans for renovating and adapting monasteries (cloisters) for use as prisons. Up to August 1955, about fifty-six monasteries had been converted. One of these is in Bartolomejska Street in Prague; others are Rodzov near Plzen, Broumov in East Bohemia, and Malacky near Bratislava.

In the two Opava prisons there are some 300 technicians, specialists in machine construction, electro-technicians, building and chemistry experts. Approximately 70 of these are German, according to the former prisoner.

Before July 1953, the second technical department was at Karlov prison, working exclusively for the nearby Skoda (now Lenin) factories. After the currency reform in July 1953, this department was transferred to the Opava prison, as a result of the revolt which broke out among the workers of the Skoda works over the currency reform. The revolt was harshly suppressed and the factory put under police guard. To prevent the prisoners from involvement in any further developments of this revolt, the technical group was transferred to the Lidicka Street section of the Opava prison.

Here the workroom cells vary in size, and from three to seven prisoners work in each cell. The cells are light and airy, with two windows of regular size in each. The only thing that makes work difficult is the overcrowding, said the former prisoner. Because of limited space, the equipment in the work cells must be turned over to those technicians who are actually working on drawings. Written work and calculations must be done in the prisoners' living quarters after working hours, in order to meet the deadlines. Because the living cells are lighted only with a single 40-watt bulb, almost half the prisoners suffer chronically from eyestrain and inflammation of the eyes, and the prison

doctor comes daily, morning and afternoon, to treat the prisoners' eyes.

Working for the ship-building industries of Prague and Komarno is the main function of the technical department organized in 1952 in Opava's Krnovska Street prison. The technical work is done in a three-story building at the back of a walled enclosure, separated by a courtyard from the main two-story prison building. There are 36 working cells. The divisions of this department are: "Naviga," working for the ship-building industries of Prague and Komarno, textile machinery; mechanism construction (making moulds or models for various appliances consisting of several parts which are assembled); mining construction, working for the Ostrava mines; rolling mills, working for the rolling mills at Kuncice near Ostrava; chemical department, working for the chemical industry.

The technical departments in both Opava prisons are visited by liaison men from the enterprise for which work is being done. These men are thoroughly checked by the STB (security police) for reliability.

In February 1955 the rolling mills group was given one week to prepare an estimate for mills of a given capacity. There was much speculation among the prisoners, as the mills were large ones. Naturally the prisoners were not supposed to know for whom they were working. However, they knew that the plans were not for Czechoslovakia since the rolling mills and steelworks at Kladno and those at Ostrava-Vitkovice were completed and the one at Hukoskice in Slovakia had been abandoned before its completion. After the estimate was delivered, the men learned through a copy of a West German technical journal that the figures had been prepared for India.

Earnings in the technical departments range from 700 to 2500 *koruny* monthly. Overtime is figured on the normal weekday rate. Normal working hours are 209 hours a month. From 55 to 60 percent of these earnings are deducted for prison costs, food, laundry, etc. Half of the earnings remaining after deductions are paid out as pocket money, from which the prisoners can buy anything available in the well-stocked canteens. The other half goes into a savings account which is paid out to the prisoner at the time of his release.

Upon release, technicians are offered jobs at the prevailing wages, housing, and even automobiles if their work requires one. If the released prisoners have families outside the country, the regime offers to bring them back to Czechoslovakia at government expense. Those Germans who insist on leaving the country are warned that they will regret their decision because they are not really wanted in the West and will find it difficult to adjust themselves to the Western economy.

The money accumulated by prisoners and paid to them upon release cannot be changed into foreign currency. As a result, German prisoners buy high priced merchandise in Czechoslovakia and come penniless to the West. Some German prisoners fear to face the unknown under these conditions and accept the jobs offered in Czechoslovakia. Reports state that German prisoners released earlier have fared well economically by remaining in Czechoslovakia.

THE COMMUNIST DRIVE against private lawyers in Hungary began in 1949-50, when lawyers were forced to give up their private offices and form professional collectives. A recent escapee, formerly a lawyer, brought up-to-date information on the situation of Hungarian lawyers since the "nationalization" of the profession. According to his report, the Chamber of Lawyers (roughly corresponding to the American Bar Association) still exists formally, but in fact the lawyers are controlled by the State Advocate Commission which is entirely under Communist Party domination. A lawyers' collective generally has 15 to 20 members. They earn about as much as skilled industrial workers (an average of 1000 *forints* per month). The offices, which are mostly former shops, "gave a poor impression." One or at the most two typists form the clerical staff.

Private lawyers in the provinces, where there are still many independent farmers, are better off than their colleagues in the cities where everything is nationalized. These lawyers make about 2000 *forints* a month and may earn as much as 4000. However, private offices are subject to very high taxes. Most private lawyers cannot afford to employ law students [as clerks.] Private lawyers are not permitted to represent State enterprises or plead cases against *kolkhozes*.

The rigid State control of Hungarian lawyers—free or "collective"—is documented by a government decree issued March 20, 1955, on the disciplinary procedure against lawyers who "adopt an attitude hostile to the political and legal order of the people's democracy." This is interpreted freely and variously by the State agencies and was the basis for the reprisals against those lawyers who were courageous enough to undertake the defense of the interests of peasants who left the *kolkhozes* in the autumn of 1953. The campaign against the so-called "lawyers of the kulaks" reached its peak in the summer of 1954.

Under these conditions the legal profession has lost its attraction as a career, and in order to encourage candidates, the government has had to resort to a few ameliorating measures. In 1955 the apprenticeship of law candidates was reduced to two years and final [bar] examinations were abolished. New lawyers are assigned to collectives exclusively or to State firms which have their own legal staff.

REFUGEES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA report that the public morality in their homeland has undergone a noticeable change as a result of the years spent under two dictatorships, and the present low standard of living. "Taking care of oneself," in the form of cheating and swindling, and subverting the State laws and regulations, is standard practice. Some of the prevalent occurrences cited by refugees are:

Salesmen in the nationalized stores cheat their customers by selling them inferior goods for higher prices, disposing of the merchandise thus "saved" on the black market to their own profit. Doctors, who can earn only a scanty livelihood legally, increase their income by making private agreements with druggists, whereby the latter issue less expensive medicines than are listed on the prescriptions,

pretending that the more expensive medicines are not available. The expensive medicines are then sold to other patients without prescription. The profit thus realized is split between the druggist and the doctor. Similar deals are made by means of prescriptions for fictitious patients. All this is possible because for the official inspections it is sufficient to balance the medicines sold against the amount of money in the cash register.

The lawyers, who are paid fixed salaries by the State-run "Legal Advisory Bureaus," do a side business of advising clients privately and clandestinely.

In the factories, skilled laborers try to get as many "achievements" credited to their names as possible without actually doing the required work. Drivers have been known to decolor the red-tinted gasoline, which is cheaper than ordinary gasoline and designed for trucks only, and use it in passenger cars.

In one instance, material intended for the construction of a large foundry was never unloaded from the freight cars but was sold to a private party while still on the rails. In another case, a high-ranking official of the Prague Information Ministry received a share of the profit of a successful theater production from the author of the play, for assisting him in getting the play staged.

ONE OF THE FEATURES of the regime press in Communist-controlled nations is that the only photographs shown to the public are those in which all the people are smiling. In Hungary, this eternal smile is the responsibility of "Hungarian Photo," the regime press photo service, whose operations were recently described by a former staff member, now a refugee.

All events in Hungary of interest to the regime are photographed. The Hungarian News Agency *Magyar Távírti Iroda* daily reports all news events to "Hungarian Photo," whose editorial committee sends its photo-reporters to selected assignments. The office is well equipped with cameras; the photographers, however, prefer their own German-made equipment to the Russian imitation Leicas. Although all reporters have identification cards, special orders are sometimes necessary—to take pictures at an airport, for instance.

The pictures are divided into publishable and classified material. The latter includes pictures of military installations and pictures showing the People's Democracy in an unfavorable light. Copies are made of all negatives, which are filed according to subject, as, for instance, "Kolkhozes" or "Peace Loan." Photographers are also trained to take good general pictures and to emphasize propaganda effects. The picture files include pre-war material, pictures from well-known Hungarian photographers which were taken over and preserved.

Non-political pictures, such as passport photos, are taken by the few private photographers still in business or by the Municipal Photo Enterprise. Reportedly, many organizations and offices employ photo reporters for propaganda purposes. Among Hungarian newspapers, however, only *Szabad Nep* and other organs of the Communist Party have their own photographers.

Polish Grain Balance

An examination of the Polish grain supply, and its various components of production and agricultural consumption. The effects of compulsory deliveries are analyzed in light of the only detailed statistical study available on the subject.

THE COMMUNISTS claim that theirs is the most efficient form of social organization, one that allows for maximum exploitation of the environment with a minimum of human effort. The complexity of social organization and the multiplicity of factors involved make any rigorous analysis of such a claim extremely difficult; there are certain key areas, however, sufficiently circumscribed to be amenable to analysis. One of these areas is the grain balance problem.

As used here, the term "grain balance" refers to the relationship between production and consumption of grain, and the relationships among the various components of production and consumption. Thanks to several investigations of the problem recently published in Polish technical journals, including a close analysis of the grain culture in one particular district, we have an unusual amount of material on the subject. Such material, as always when dealing with official regime figures, must be used with great circumspection.

In prewar Poland (1938) grain production was approximately 13.5 million metric tons. This amount considerably exceeded home consumption, and there were sizeable grain exports. Within the boundaries of present-day Poland the 1938 grain production was almost the same, despite the smaller cultivated area, because of the high yields from the farm land of what is now western Poland, but was then eastern Germany.

In 1946, shortly after the war, grain production was down to 38 percent of that in 1938 (all prewar figures refer to postwar boundaries unless otherwise noted), even though the area sown to grain was only reduced to 59 percent, and the population reduced to 73 percent of the prewar totals. This striking decrease in yield per hectare was due largely to the ravages of war and the disorganization of the immediate postwar years. The serious grain deficit (production per person was almost halved) was covered

"First Grain to the State!"



Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), August 12, 1955

by imports from the USSR and UNRRA assistance. In addition, the livestock situation had greatly deteriorated.

The recovery was rapid. By 1949 production had risen to 89 percent of that in 1938, while the population was only 76 percent of prewar times. The livestock position, although also much improved, was still somewhat lower per capita for hogs and cattle, although the horse and sheep population was slightly higher per capita than before the war. Table I gives the figures for 1938 (prewar boundaries), 1938 (postwar boundaries), 1946 and 1949.

Although by 1949 per capita production was higher than in 1938, this was in some measure due to the greatly reduced population; yields were still below 1938. Quintal per hectare yields were: 1938 (prewar), 11.5; 1938 (postwar), 13.1; 1946, 8.42; 1949, 12.8. In addition, per capita consumption had, according to regime sources, increased markedly. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 11, 1955, stated that the present population consumes the same amount of grain as did a prewar population eight million larger. The grain position in 1949, therefore, although much better than in the immediate postwar years, was still precarious.

Following 1949, the position deteriorated. No precise figures were given for the ensuing years. We know that the Six Year Plan (1950-55) provided for a production of 14.5 million tons, an increase of 22 percent in six years, by 1955. This was to be accomplished without increasing the area sown, by means of improved cultivation, more machinery and fertilizers—by raising the yield.

An article in *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), 1, 1955, revealed

Table I
Grain and Livestock 1938-1955

Grain	1938 (prewar) ¹	1938 (postwar) ¹	1946 ¹	1949 ²	1952 ³	1953 ³	1955 ³
Area sown to grain (million hectares)	11.693	10.104	6.019	9.226	8.913	8.913	8.913
Grain production (million metric tons)	13.452	13.273	5.070	11.852	11.409	10.606	12.
Per capita production (kilos)	384	411	215	480	—	400.23	444.
<i>Livestock</i>							
Horses (million)	3.916	3.148	1.729	2.538	—	—	—
Per capita	.112	.097	.073	.103	—	—	—
Cattle (million)	10.554	9.924	3.910	6.365	—	—	8.
Per capita	.301	.307	.166	.258	—	—	.296
Hogs (million)	7.525	9.684	2.674	6.120	—	—	11.
Per capita	.215	.300	.113	.248	—	—	.407
Sheep (million)	3.411	1.940	0.727	1.621	—	—	4.5
Per capita	.097	.060	.031	.066	—	—	.167

¹ *Statystyka Rolnictwa 1938-1947* (Warsaw), *Roczniki Statystyczne* for 1939 and 1948 (Warsaw).

² *Analiza Wykonania Planu Trzyletniego*, K. Sekomski; Warsaw:

1950, p. 43.

³ See text.

that in 1953 the area sown to the four major grains (in effect, the total grain production) was 313,000 hectares less than in 1949, and the grain yields were smaller. Taking the very low 1946 yields as an index of 100, yields in 1949 rose to 143, in 1952 dropped back to 127, and fell even further the following year. Given this decrease in both yields and area, a production decrease is obvious, although the regime has been extremely reluctant to admit it explicitly. *Ekonomista*, 1-2, 1954, for example, stated that the 1953 production was six percent higher than the average 1947-49 production—an oblique admission of failure since, as we have seen, production was at that period coming up from a very low level.

Politburo member Zenon Nowak, in a speech to the II Party Congress in March 1954, indicated that the grandiose plans for production increases had been sharply modified. By 1955, he stated, grain production should reach 12 million tons (a scant 150,000 tons higher than 1949). This would necessitate, Nowak said, a production increase of 600,000 tons over 1952, implying that the 1952 production was 11.4 million tons (this must be considered an implication rather than a rigorous arithmetic deduction because of the extreme unreliability of figures quoted in official speeches). The 1953 harvest was poor, largely because of bad weather, and the 1953 Plan report stated that production was lower than in 1952.

Gospodarka Planowa (Warsaw), December 1953, stated that the average yield in 1952 was 12.8 quintals per hectare, and that this fell to 11.9 in 1953. This would imply a 1952 production of 11.409 million tons and a 1953 production of 10.606 million tons (taking productive area as 8.913 million hectares as indicated by *Ekonomista* 1, 1955). These figures coincide sufficiently with Nowak's to be taken

as highly probable. Table I shows the data derived from them.

As far as grain supplies available for human consumption were concerned, the situation was further aggravated by the increase in livestock population. By 1955 there were 8 million cattle, 11 million hogs and 4.5 million sheep; this brought the per capita hog and sheep population well above the prewar level, the cattle population above that of 1949 but still slightly below the prewar figure. The remarkable upsurge in livestock left relatively less grain available as human food.

The picture of rapid recovery of grain production, followed by a decline, is borne out by the grain export-import balance with the non-Communist world. Table II gives that balance.

Table II
Export-Import Balance with the Non-Communist World (tons of grain)

Prewar (prewar boundaries) ¹	plus 696,400
1948 ¹	minus 251,000
1949 ¹	plus 520,000
1950 ²	plus 155,000
1951 ²	plus 65,000
1952 ²	plus 110,000
1954 ³	minus 300,000

¹ Estimates in *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics*, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, Vol. VI, Part 2; Rome, 1953. It must be stressed that this table says nothing about the absolute grain surplus or deficit in Poland. Imports from the Soviet bloc, particularly the USSR, are not indicated; furthermore, trade with the West would be modified by Western agricultural conditions.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. VII, Part 2; 1954.

³ See text.



"Horrors! The production of two months destroyed!"

Krokodil (Moscow), February 28, 1955

These figures, including as they do only trade outside the bloc, do not give an accurate picture of import-exports; they do indicate the trend. In 1955, it was learned that Poland was negotiating a purchase of 251,745 tons of Canadian wheat.

On March 11, 1955 *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), admitted that the (1954) grain deficit had reached one million tons, and that this amount was imported. Seventy percent of the imports came from the Soviet Union, the rest from South America and the Middle East.

The 1955 harvest was extremely good; perfect weather ripened a bumper crop of 12 million tons. The yield, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, September 19, 1955 was 1 quintal per hectare higher than in 1954. It is most doubtful that any element of State planning or organization was responsible for this excellent harvest. The elements were kind; it is not a kindness that can be depended on for the future. Also, despite the increase in total production over 1949, the population has grown so rapidly that per capita production in 1955 was well below that in the earlier year.

The decline in grain production after 1949 can safely be ascribed to the introduction, however guardedly, of agricultural collectivization, and the drive toward heavy industrialization. The former alienated the peasantry, the latter created in certain areas a shortage of agricultural manpower (although on nothing like the Czechoslovak scale).

Consumption

Agricultural consumption of grain in general has, according to the regime, decreased since 1949. *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 4, April, 1955, stated:

"During the first years after the liberation the level of flour consumption [by the agricultural population] showed a considerable increase in comparison with the prewar period. The higher consumption during the years 1948-49 is explained by the fact that those years saw the liquidation of village undernourishment. During the years 1951-52 the consumption of rye flour decreased; in some groups of holdings the consumption of wheat flour decreased also. This, in turn, is explained by the improvement of the living standard of the agricultural population and by the greater consumption of meat, fat, sugar and other consumption articles."

Both "explanations" given appear spurious. According to figures in the same article, consumption of rye and wheat flour increased very slightly from 1936-37 to 1948-49. For holdings of 2-5 hectares (probably the most numerous) consumption, indeed, decreased from 174 kilos per adult in 1936-37 to 170 kilos in 1948-49. For the other categories of holdings, the largest increase was of no more than 17 kilos. From 1948-49 to 1951-52, all categories registered a decrease of consumption (ranging up to 51 kilos), except the category of 2-5 hectare holdings, which increased consumption by 1 kilo. These figures indicate neither a great increase over the prewar years by 1949, nor, for the category of smallest and most numerous holdings, any later shift to a better diet.

Concerning the "explanation" of improved, higher protein diets, the article quotes figures showing 100 percent increases in meat consumption among peasants. Since accounts by refugees and non-Communist visitors have repeatedly referred to the low protein diet level in Poland, there is room for a great deal of doubt as to the accuracy of these remarkable figures.

The *Gospodarka Planowa* article stated that 35 percent of grain production goes to human agricultural consumption and that 30 to 40 percent goes for animal consumption. As analysis of more detailed studies indicates, there are very wide divergences in these percentages, depending upon the size of the holding. When consumption, animal and human, seed grain and losses through waste have been subtracted, the remainder is the marketable surplus. It is this marketable surplus which, theoretically, is the target of compulsory delivery quotas.

Compulsory Deliveries

By 1951 the grain shortage was apparent, and on July 23 the regime reacted by imposing compulsory deliveries. These were followed by quotas for potatoes, meat and milk. The grain quotas were raised on July 10, 1952, and they are still in force today.

The level at which compulsory delivery quotas are established depends on a number of factors, political as well as economic. Some of these factors, in terms of desired ends, may be mutually contradictory. For example, the regime might wish to establish very moderate quotas either for political reasons (to gain rural support) or for the encouragement of production. On the other hand, production without control over distribution is of little value to the regime, and therefore high quotas are indicated, since the higher the quotas, the tighter is the control. Another factor tending to the establishment of high quotas is that the larger

the percentage of the grain supply obtained by the State at the very low quota prices, and sold at the much higher retail prices, the greater the State income. In addition, as the *Gospodarka Planowa* article pointed out, high quotas may be used as a political weapon, "in limiting the capitalist elements in the village."

The computation of what are high or low quotas depends, in turn, upon the estimate of the market surplus of various categories of holding. Until recently, it was the official (or officially stated) assumption that the relation between delivery quotas and internal agricultural needs permitted the farmers a grain surplus over and above their own needs and delivery obligations. Delivery quotas had been established on the basis of the 1949-51 market supply. In 1950 the market supply was 32.8 percent of total grain production; in 1951, under the impact of the first quotas, this rose to 44.8 percent. In 1952 there were large quota arrears and the market supply fell to 35.3 percent of production (*Gospodarka Planowa*, October 1954).

Despite the fact that grain production declined after 1949 rather than, as planned, increasing, there was no move to reduce quotas. Delivery failures were attributed to peasant selfishness and kulak-inspired sabotage. Statistics were published showing that peasants retained a sizeable surplus to sell on the free market. Such figures, for example, were presented in *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw), 1954, published by the Institute for Agrarian Economics. They indicated that in Cracow and Rzeszow Provinces poor peasants (with up to 3 hectares of land) had a mar-



"Do not delay the fulfillment of your citizen's duty! Fulfill in time the obligatory deliveries to the State!"

Part of poster in *Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna* (Warsaw), September 1, 1955

ketable surplus of 8.7 percent of their total grain, including compulsory deliveries of 4.1 percent of total grain. Middle peasants (3 to 9 hectares) had a marketable surplus of 11.7 percent, compulsory deliveries of 6.5 percent. "Kulaks" (over 9 hectares) had a marketable surplus of 27.3 percent, compulsory deliveries of 16.6 percent. In Poznan and Bydgoszcz Provinces the figures were: poor peasants, 39.2 percent and 4.0 percent; middle peasants, 32.6 percent and 21.4 percent; kulaks, 40.3 percent and 31.0 percent. (It must be stressed that these figures were based on tiny samplings of the area.) These statistics purport to demonstrate the small percentage of surplus taken by deliveries, especially for the poorer peasants, presumably favored by the regime.

More recent studies, however, indicate that these findings were false. The April 1955 *Gospodarka Planowa* discussed the grain problem, stating that previous estimates of grain distribution—the internal needs of agriculture, market surpluses, etc.—had "serious shortcomings" because of flaws in research and investigation. Particularly the elements of human and animal consumption and grain loss, it was stated, were improperly analyzed.

The article discussed statistical methods used in computing the grain balance. It stated that the grain production volume was determined by the sowing area (given as approximately 62 percent of arable land) and the yields per hectare (given as 12-13 quintals per hectare). Grain consumption (composed of peasant and animal consumption, seed grain, storage and collection losses) is subtracted from this total production to give the marketable surplus, to be disposed of either through compulsory deliveries or free market sales. The article concludes by reminding the reader that actual grain surpluses, rather than statistical computations, "should serve as the basis for the grain purchasing plans."

A much more detailed examination of the problem appeared in *Gospodarka Zbozowa* (Warsaw), March 1955. This study examined the grain situation of a sample of 10 percent of the peasant holdings of Pulawy District, Lublin Province. Table III presents the findings.

Before analyzing these figures, it must be stressed that they represent the results of a limited sampling in one district in a single province. There is no available data on distortions that may be inherent in extrapolating these results for the whole country. We do know that agriculture in Pulawy District is typical of that in several provinces, and that is presumably why it was chosen for sampling. Further, *Zagadnienia Ekonomiki Rolnej* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1955, gave some information on the whole of Pulawy District: the average holding is 3.7 hectares (somewhat below the national average), 41.9 percent of holdings are three hectares or less (poor peasants), 56.6 percent are 3 to 11 hectares (middle peasants), and 1.5 percent over 11 hectares ("kulaks"). Livestock possession averages .7 horses, 1.7 cows and 3 hogs per holding. The density of agricultural population, 90 persons per 100 hectares, is very high.

The figures in Table III present an extraordinary picture. The smaller holdings, the great majority of the sample, are

10 percent of Pulawy District Holdings, 1952-53¹

Table III

Group	No. of Holdings	Total Grain (hectares)	Average Grain (hectares)	Total Production (kilos)	Average Production (kilos)	Yield (quintal per hectare)	Av. Sown Grain (kilos)	Av. Human consumption (kilos per holding)	Percentage of Prod.	Av. Animal Consumption (kilos per holding)	Percentage of Prod.	Av. Compulsory Deliveries (kilos)		Percent of Prod.		Av. Surplus or Deficit	
												1952	1953	1952	1953	1952	1953
I	1,047	1,078	1.03	1,075,269	1,027	9.97	186	487	47	620	60	85	79	8.3	7.7	-351	-345
II	754	1,252	1.66	1,537,406	2,039	12.28	299	581	29	1,134	56	269	320	13.2	15.7	-243	-295
III	322	747	2.32	1,012,690	3,145	13.56	418	649	23	1,512	48	581	757	18.5	24.1	15	-171
IV	102	308	3.02	448,902	4,401	14.57	544	748	17	1,963	45	1,094	1,309	24.9	29.7	52	-163
V	38	162	4.26	246,620	6,490	15.23	767	817	13	2,602	40	1,895	2,445	29.2	37.7	409	-151
VI	7	51	7.29	72,933	10,419	14.30	1,312	780	7.5	3,383	32	3,274	4,315	31.4	41.4	1,670	629
		Tot.	12.21						28.9					15.6	18.8	-523,013	-656,666
		Tot.	52.7														

¹ *Gospodarka Zbozowa* gives the following information on its compilation: the material was prepared by the Institute of Agrarian Economics from data given by village national councils and organs of the Ministry of Procurement and Contract Purchase. Ten percent of all peasant holdings in Pulawy District were investigated. Figures on internal use of grain are for 1952. Total production figures are based on the sowing structure of peasant holdings and per hectare yields as computed by

the Central Statistical office. Seed grain was computed at an average of 180 kilos per hectare. Human consumption was computed from a similar study in Pulawy District for the years 1951-52. Animal consumption was computed by multiplying feeding norms by number of livestock (horses, cattle, hogs). Compulsory delivery figures taken from the Ministry. Figures in roman type were those published by *Gospodarka Zbozowa*, figures in italics were calculated therefrom.

Regime Propaganda



Diagram entitled "So it was," harps on alleged past ills and, in an obvious attempt to justify unpopular present policies, claims that landlords, with one percent of the holdings, held 50 percent of the land, while poor peasants, who owned 64.6 percent of the holdings, had only 14 percent of the land.

Spółdzielnia Produkcyjna (Warsaw), September 8, 1955

completely crushed under the weight of their compulsory deliveries; in 1952 only holdings in the three larger categories, comprising only 6.5 percent of the sampled holdings and 14.5 percent of the grain area, were not forced into deficit by compulsory deliveries. That is, for the greatest number of peasants, the deliveries demanded grain that was not available, after the needs of consumption and seed were met. The only way in which deliveries could be met (and it must be stressed that the delivery figures given are for *actual deliveries*, not mere plans), was to buy grain at high free market prices to sell it to the State at low quota prices. In 1953, only the category of largest holdings, those averaging over 7.29 hectares sown to grain, were not forced into deficit by compulsory quotas. This data completely contradicts the previous official assumption that delivery quotas are a modest proportion of the market surplus, and that quotas are graduated to favor the small peasant.

There are other points of interest in the findings. The yields of the few largest holdings are startlingly higher than those of the many smaller holdings. The average yield for the total sample is 12.21 quintals per hectare. The yield for the category of smallest holdings (I), comprising 30

percent of the total sample hectareage, is 9.97 quintals per hectare; the yield for the two categories of smallest holdings (I and II), comprising 65 percent of the total sample hectareage, is 11.21. The yield of the category of largest holdings (VI), totaling only 1.4 percent of the whole sample hectareage, is 14.30 quintals per hectare.

Among the political implications of the Pulawy District findings is that the peasants with larger holdings are far less oppressed by compulsory deliveries and have a far greater market surplus than small or middle peasants, despite regime agitation for "kulak" repression. The findings confirm the impression that those "kulaks" subject to regime attack are defined by their political attitudes rather than the size of their holdings. At present the regime cannot afford to endanger the sector of agriculture producing its highest grain yields, its most efficient agricultural sector.

Indeed, the greater efficiency of the larger holdings is very striking. The figures indicate that in the category of smallest holdings (I), the needs of animal and human consumption alone, exclusive of seed grain and losses, not to speak of delivery quotas, exceeded total production. In the two categories of smallest holdings, human and animal consumption combined was 92 percent of total production. In the category of largest holdings, on the other hand, human and animal consumption amounted to only 53 percent of production. The average percentage of production taken by human and animal consumption was 81.6 percent.

Total grain production of the sample was 4,393,820 kilos. Of this, 4,232,168 kilos, or 96.3 percent, was used for sowing and for human and animal consumption. There was a market surplus (ignoring losses through wastage), therefore, of 161,652 kilos. Of this, the two "kulak" categories (V and VI) provided 122,160 kilos, or 76 percent. The total market surplus of the other four categories, poor and middle peasants, was 39,492; category I had a market deficit of 278,502 kilos. From these figures at any rate it is clear that despite the much greater number of small holdings, and their consequent large proportion of total production, the regime is overwhelmingly dependent on the large holdings for the vital market surplus.

The Peasant's Back

In discussing the Pulawy District findings, the *Gospodarka Zbozowa* article stressed that the compulsory delivery figures indicated were actual deliveries, not projected quotas. If the projected quotas had been fulfilled 100 percent, it said, all categories but VI would have had deficits as early as 1952, notwithstanding the lower original quotas.

These deficits would have amounted to 367 kilos for each poor peasant holding, 213 kilos for weak middle peasants, 37 kilos for strong middle peasants. "Kulaks" would have had 480 kilos of surplus per holding. These deficits would, of course, have been much greater in 1953, due to decreased production and increased quotas. As the article put it, "The compulsory deliveries take from the sampled holdings the whole marketable surplus of grain and in some cases even more than the surplus," and, as a result, "the grain balance is strained." The "some cases" referred to is a large majority of the sample.

A system in which farmers are required to surrender more than their marketable surplus is exploitative and must rest on force and intimidation. As has been shown, large sectors of the peasantry are forced to buy back from the State at free market prices grain surrendered at the very low compulsory delivery prices. *Gospodarka Planowa*, October 1954, gave the following figures comparing quota and free market prices in 1953 (zlotys per quintal): rye, 60:271; wheat, 103:315; barley, 63:228; oats, 63:258. It is by payment of these immense differences that the Polish peasant has supported the industrialization and urbanization of the country. *Gospodarka Planowa*, April 1955, stated that 30 percent of the grain collected through compulsory deliveries is resold by the State to the peasants. As *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 137, points out, low-priced compulsory deliveries are the peasants' contribution toward financing the Six Year Plan. It was not a voluntary contribution.

The regime has made it clear that at present no reduction of the compulsory delivery burden is intended. Doubtless the pressure was somewhat relieved by the excellent harvest this year. In the past, it was only through imports of grain that the Polish economy (which by and large is the soundest of all the captive nations' economies) was able to feed its people.

The present system of organization in uncollectivized Polish agriculture appears to be a pyramid, in which a relatively small percentage of kulak holdings at the top provide a high proportion of the market surplus, while the large number of markedly less productive small holdings are at the base. The high productivity of kulak holdings explains the recent rash of statements to the effect that, although the kulaks are still ideologically unendurable, they must nevertheless be allowed, even encouraged, to produce. *Trybuna Ludu*, August 3, 1955, stated the position clearly:

"... bringing about the collapse of the existing kulak farms creates no benefits and reduces total agricultural production. . . . The decline of the production of kulak farms does not lie in our interest. That is why it may prove wise, for example—under clearly defined conditions—to permit the kulaks to use MTS machinery, in order to facilitate rational and productive husbandry."

At the same time, the imposition of crushing compulsory delivery quotas on smallholders who can barely produce enough to feed themselves and their livestock exerts a strong pressure toward collectivization. Poland's eventual goal, as it is the goal of all Communist agriculture, is full



"This is the way some farm directors achieve planned increases in livestock weights."

Krokodil (Moscow), September 10, 1955

collectivization. If that is not to be attained by the methods of terror (and there is every indication that such methods have presently been abjured), then an alternate method is just such a maintenance of steady pressure on the smallholders, while permitting the kulaks to produce the necessary market surplus.

The Polish agricultural structure of today, therefore, is in Communist eyes an interim one. That interim, however, may well prove to be of long duration; economic and political pressures established by the regime have to contend with the resistance of a tough and stubborn peasantry. During that long interim, the majority of Polish peasantry will continue to pay with sweat and deprivation for the imposition of Communist ideology pursued by Communist methods.

Current Developments

Area

Christmas Message

THE BROADCAST of President Eisenhower's Christmas message to the peoples of Eastern Europe aroused a storm of response in the Communist press and radio. The President stated in part that the American people recognize the trials under which the East European peoples are suffering and "join you in your concern for the restoration of individual freedom and political liberty and share your faith that right in the end will prevail to bring you once again among the free nations of the world." The Communists claimed that the message called for the return of capitalism and the "old regimes" in Eastern Europe and called it gross interference in their internal affairs. Following is a selection of some of the regime reactions to the message.


Szabad Nep (Budapest), December 31, 1955:

"Every year Radio 'Free Europe' broadcasts a 'Christmas message' to the People's Democracies. It was possible to assume that this Christmas, ending a year in which international tension was seen to diminish, 'Free Europe' would change this . . . custom. It was possible to expect that they would pull themselves together in the Munich lie factory and realize that their messages were in contradiction to the people's struggle for peace and to peaceful coexistence among nations. . . . It seems [however] that the proverb about the leopard not changing its spots is entirely applicable. . . . Radio 'Free Europe' did not restrain itself this year either. But it is not worthwhile talking about 'Free Europe.' It is, however, unquestionably to be regretted and condemned that the President of the US also takes part in sending messages which are not at all in the Christmas spirit. He expressed his fellow-feeling for all kinds of traitors who escaped from or were driven out of the People's Democracies. . . .

"What would the US President say if the Soviet Prime Minister were to call upon the American people to overthrow the capitalist system? Surely, he would be indignant. We merely intend to establish the fact that the President's message constituted as blatant a form of interference in our domestic affairs as the messages of his associates. . . .

"The hopes expressed from year to year do not hurt us. . . . We are advancing firmly . . . on our chosen road. With regard to 'our worries,' mentioned with such fellow-feeling by the American President, we do not believe that the Hungarian people have the same worries as their former lords. . . . The cares of those lords are too great to be dispelled by the US President.

"Of course, we, too, have our worries . . . but these are different from those of the Munich gentlemen who dream



1956 to 1955: "Take these decorations with you . . ."

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 1, 1956

of taking power. And, whether or not it pleases certain imperialist circles, we do not intend to trust solution of them to others. Therefore, we advise the senders of Christmas messages not to bother . . . in 1956. Let them put on an appropriate dance record—they will have greater success."

Radio Sofia, January 9:

" . . . a new racist organization led by Senator Eastland has been set up in 12 American States. One cannot help but compare this situation with the impertinent attacks . . . contained in the so-called Christmas messages. These 'prayers' [of prominent American statesmen] constitute, in fact, a gross interference in the internal affairs and national independence of States. [They] expressed a futile desire to restore the vicious capitalist order in the free and peaceful People's Democracies. The people in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria understood this very well and became even firmer in their refusal to permit the return to capitalist exploitation of the past."

Radio Bucharest (in English), January 6:

"In these messages . . . US foreign policy-makers prayed to God to change the regimes in the People's Democracies.

... The messages constituted direct and arrogant interference in the internal affairs of other countries. ... There is little doubt about what provoked such fury in certain circles: it was Bulganin's and Khrushchev's visit to India, Burma and Afghanistan. British papers, whose correspondents know the psychology of the Indian and Burmese masses very well, speak of the 'mystical delirium' [inspired] in the Asian masses by the Soviet leaders.

"The liberation of India and Burma from the grip of colonialism deprives imperialism of an additional 400 million customers who, along with 600 million Chinese, 100 million members of the People's Democracies, and 200 million Soviet citizens, make up half the world population. American foreign policy-makers have good reason indeed to be agitated. The peace camp, however, is not intimidated. ... [US] provocations will not disturb [our] clear vision and sure knowledge that we serve the cause of civilization and ... mankind."

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), January 3:

"[There was a period after 1918] ... when the US discreetly directed Polish economic life, selling us as much as possible, and permitting us to sell only our freedom. This method was reliable and Mr. Harriman could speak about it at great length. ... President Eisenhower and other statesmen say, 'We are praying for freedom in democracy's name.' We should state quite openly that our conceptions of democracy differ and [explain] why democracy in the US is different for ... those who are white and those who are black, for those who have and those who have not. ...

"Poles are not geese and they, too, have their own minds. For that reason, when President Eisenhower prays for our conversion to capitalism, we know he does not do it altruistically. He prays ... that Poland will find herself in the family of free nations—that is, in the Atlantic Pact and West European Union. ... Within such a Union it undoubtedly would be easy to clarify the question of the Western Territories—Szczecin, Wrocław and Gdansk. Mr. Eisenhower forgets that Poles know the purpose of this prayer. Knowing US policy on German militarism, Poles haven't the slightest illusion. ... Under US guidance, Poland would become capitalist, and old landowners and industrialists would turn back the clock, throwing peasants off the land. ... Harriman would exploit copper mining and Polish foreign policy would be made in Washington.

"If Eisenhower really wants to win Poland ... he should not support German revisionism ... or interfere in Poland's internal affairs."

Radio Prague (in English), January 2:

"We have done away with capitalism in our country forever.' This is the Czechoslovak people's firm answer to the provocative 'Christmas message' of US President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. ... In thousands of talks ... the Czechoslovak people have expressed their indignation with this shameless interference in the affairs of a free and sovereign State ruled by the people. ... In the Liberec automobile works, the workers ended their discussion by stating: 'Our work speaks for itself. Its only aim is to build a beautiful home, a home of free people in our country.'"

Radio Prague, January 1:

[Quoting from *Prace*] "Khrushchev also referred to the so-called Christmas message of President Eisenhower. ...

This message was also transmitted to our country by various deceitful short and middle waves from the West and, naturally, failed to arouse any response. This demonstrates our people's patriotic conscience, but this in no way diminishes the imperialists' ill will. The contents of these messages expressed nothing more nor less than the desire to change the regime in our country and the US [desire] to support this. It is necessary to ask: Who, in the United States [will support this]? Certainly not the American people. It is not in the least a message from the American people ... but a message from capitalist representatives."

Agricultural Integration

The much-discussed emphasis on increasing economic integration of the Soviet bloc has generally stressed industry and transportation rather than agriculture. Even Bulgaria, one of the least industrialized countries of the bloc, and the only one not beginning a Five Year Plan this year, has stressed the benefits to be derived from industrial specialization and regional planning. It appears, however, that integration and planning is also to be extended to agriculture. In October 1955, at Sofia, an International Scientific Conference on the Regional Organization of Agricultural Crops and on Organization and Economic Strengthening of Collective Farms was held. It was attended by delegations from the USSR and the European captive nations, from the Communist nations of Asia, and, most interestingly, from Yugoslavia. No report on the work of the Conference was issued at the time. The November 1955 issue of *Kooperativno Zemedelie* (Sofia), organ of the Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture, however, carried an article on the Conference. Somewhat abbreviated, it said:

"Delegations from the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, and from all the other People's Democracies participated in the Conference. During the six days, problems of the Socialist reorganization of agriculture were discussed from the high forum of international People's Democratic solidarity, with knowledge, care, and a deep sense of responsibility.

"The basic Conference reports were delivered by the Bulgarian delegates: 'On the Regional Distribution and Organization of Crops,' by Titko Chernokolev ... and 'On the Organization and Economic Strengthening of Kolchozes,' by Mincho Georgiev. ... Additional reports from the participating delegations were added to these. This enormous amount of scientific material ... must be carefully studied by our scientific and organizational workers....

"But aside from the study of the Conference materials and the valuable conclusions to be drawn therefrom, the Conference once more proved clearly and indisputably how high the level of international cooperation is among the peoples fighting for peace and Socialism. The economic development of the countries of the Socialist camp is based on a new international division of labor, and on Socialist cooperation, making for full equality and mutual benefit. These fundamental principles operate with full force in regard to modifications of agricultural production, Socialist specialization of regions, and the multiple development of rural economies. ...

"The modifications of agricultural production under

capitalism occurred suddenly, under the influence of the world market, and therefore regions tended to narrow specialization, largely in products for foreign trade. Now, in our basically collectivized, large, mechanized and modern agricultural production, we have created conditions for the liquidation of this extremely irregular development in certain sectors, for the total economic growth of all regions of our country.

"The modifications and regional organization of agricultural production under Socialism are subordinated to Socialist principles, with one aim: satisfaction of the need for agricultural products and rational use of the natural and economic conditions in each region, with the greatest economy of labor. These modifications are not rigid. They are continually changing under the influence of shifts in the rural economy and in the total economic development of the country—especially the rapid development of Socialist industrialization.

"The new international division of labor among the countries of the democratic camp demands detailed study of the possibilities for the most adequate regional distribution of agricultural production, not only within each country, but within the total area of all countries of the Socialist camp—a principle of which the foundations have already been laid. The wealth of experience on regional organization in the different . . . countries which was shared at the Conference will create the possibility of better and more correct work on this regional distribution in the future."

Hungary

Writers' Rebellion

A Party Central Committee resolution condemning "rightist phenomena" in Hungarian literary life and, specifically, an "anti-Party" demonstration at a November meeting of the Writers' Union, appeared in *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), December 10, 1955. The resolution stated that Hungarian writers rarely depict the life of the working class and that their works on the peasantry betray the "anti-Socialist smallholders' view of life." In the past two years, the resolution claimed, writers have failed to support Party goals, succumbed to pessimism and despair, cultivated art for art's sake, mistaking "constructive work for senseless drudgery," and "have welcomed all this as something new . . . as a victory over schematism":

"They have not realized that they have exchanged schematism . . . for the contorted versions of the bourgeoisie and have consciously or unconsciously become the spokesmen for the . . . most backward strata. All this is expressed in 'apolitical' poetry, or anarchist, pseudo-revolutionary poetry, which identifies everyday work with the senseless robot, in nihilistic and cynical disbelief, and in . . . symbolism directed against our system. . . . This type of literature, which has been published particularly in *Irodalmi Ujsag* . . . does not serve the people; on the contrary, it turns against them and becomes a banner in the hands of reactionaries. It is obvious that this attack is not of a literary nature but

Despite the widely publicized announcements of certain U.S. politicians about the desire to establish cultural intercourse between East and West, the State Department, as is reported by the New York Times of November 11, has ordered a let-up in the exchange of cultural visits with the Soviet Union and has refused to issue entry visas to a group of Soviet specialists on hybrid seeds.



STRANGE HOSPITALITY

Drawing by J. Novak

For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (Bucharest).

is essentially political and is directed against the People's Democracy."

The Central Committee resolution then singled out Communists Tibor Dery, Zoltan Zelk, Tamas Aczel, Tibor Merai and Gyula Hay as writers who, "sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of rightist mistakes," had openly voiced their "anti-popular and anti-Party views" and had organized an opposition faction within the Party. In what amounted to a "frontal attack," this group of writers had drafted a memorandum to the Central Committee in which they repudiated Party policy, objected to Party control of literature and questioned the Party's dismissal of certain journalists accused of "rightist opportunism."

"At the November 10 session of the Writers' Union . . . certain writers . . . voiced bourgeois slanders concerning the situation of workers and peasants and their living standard. Under the pretext of criticism, they adopted a hostile attitude towards leading Party and government organs and functionaries. They denied the need for . . . Party guidance of literature. By moral pressure and threats they tried to terrorize those Communist writers who rejected their attacks against the Party. All this was aggravated by the organized nature of the action. Certain [officials] of the Writers' Union violated the elementary rules of Party discipline and in a demonstrative way resigned from their

posts. Dery, Zelk and companions . . . prepared a memorandum . . . protesting the March resolution. . . .

"The memorandum . . . is really an anti-Party platform which was addressed to the Central Committee for the sole purpose of demonstrating against the Party at membership meetings and elsewhere. Every Party member has the right of turning to the Central Committee either directly or via his own Party organization, but no one may collect signatures for an attack against the Party's policy within circles composed mostly of credulous Communists."

The resolution concluded that a counterattack must be launched against "bourgeois ideological trends," that members of the Writers' Union must be made to observe Party discipline, and that steps must be taken to insure the development of "Socialist realism." "The competent Party organs shall investigate the cases of those writers who opposed the March resolution . . . and tried to organize an opposition group within the Party."

The beginning of the writers' rebellion dates to the Nagy period, when writers were given more freedom and encouraged to depict reality truthfully instead of "sugar-coating" it. All the writers mentioned in the Central Committee resolution are veteran Communists who supported Nagy's policies, and who evidently decided to continue in this support and organized a campaign for literary freedom even though Nagy had been ousted from the government.

Czechoslovakia

New Tone in Relations with USSR

There has been a variety of indications since last summer that the Soviet Union is relenting on the degree of admiration and "emulation" it expects from some of the Satellite regimes. In Czechoslovakia, one aspect of this change in relationship has become apparent in a trend towards greater equality in the exchange of industrial techniques. In September 1955, the editor-in-chief of *Dikobraz* (Prague), Vaclav Jelinek, set the new tone in a report on the Czechoslovak exhibition in Moscow.

Jelinek stated that "There are people in our country who, for God knows what reasons, describe Soviet citizens as people who can do everything, and do it to perfection, by a simple wave of the hand. According to these concepts, the Soviet man has only to think, and at one stroke the greatest ideas . . . occur to him so that he has no reason to know what others do." Jelinek also stated that, although such people imagine they are doing a great service to Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship, they are in reality damaging it. The exhibition, Jelinek claimed, would probably put an end to such thinking. Not only would the Czechoslovaks look at Soviet installations, but Soviet miners would come to see the new Czechoslovak mining machines. "The Soviet people want to know how we do these things, they want to learn and become acquainted with everything in which we are successful and experienced."

On September 18, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders visited the exhibition and, according to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 19, paid special attention to Czechoslovak machines, particularly cars, motorcycles and the shuttleless loom. With respect to Czechoslovak automobiles,

"Yapping Stations"



Zolnierz Polski (Warsaw), May 1955

Khrushchev was quoted as having said: "It is necessary to come to an agreement with the countries of the Socialist camp and to create in cooperation with them conditions for mass production of these cars."

On October 9, *Rude Pravo* reported that the Soviet press had recently announced that many Byelorussian footwear plants were using Czechoslovak methods and that a correspondent from a Soviet glassware plant who had visited Czechoslovakia told a conference of Soviet engineers and technicians about the importance of the knowledge she had gained. On November 5, *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague) wrote that a member of the Moscow Ministry of Trade who had just returned from Czechoslovakia had praised its "high-level restaurants and mature personnel," and had remarked, "I have really learned a great deal."

The same note was sounded for the remainder of the year. On November 6, *Rude Pravo* warned that "application of Soviet experiences" could be successful only if Czechoslovak conditions were taken into consideration. *Prace* (Prague), November 9, pointed out that "visits of our outstanding workers [to the USSR] means no small contribution to Soviet plants," and on December 6, *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) quoted the speech of the Deputy Chairman of the Stalingrad Executive Committee on his return home from Czechoslovakia: "For me, as a representative of Stalingrad, it was of great importance to see the industrial housing methods as applied in Czechoslovakia. There is



"Come in a week, we'll have them then . . ."

Szpilki (Warsaw), January 1, 1956

something we can learn from our Czechoslovak friends and we will use their experience in our city."

The most sweeping pronouncement on the subject so far came on December 11, when Jaroslav Vojtech, speaking over Radio Prague, warned that "many of our people frequently embarrass Soviet people by their exaggerated admiration of certain things in the USSR even though the Soviet comrades know very well that some things in our country are at least as good." Vojtech then described an incident which he deemed characteristic. At a conference with Soviet writer Gulia, a leading Czechoslovak journalist proposed the following toast: "We drink to the health of Soviet journalists, our teachers, whose grateful pupils we, the Czechoslovak newspapermen, shall ever remain." Gulia answered: "Friends, I think that you, the heirs of Havlicek, Neruda and Fucik, are not our pupils nor we your teachers. We are, above all, fighters for a common cause."

Vojtech said that the attitude of the above-mentioned Czechoslovak journalist was not uncommon: "Many zealots adopt Soviet experiences in spite of the fact that our own experiences are not only sufficient but of a kind that Soviet experts would gladly adopt themselves." Pointing out that exchange of experiences must be mutual, Vojtech quoted the director of the Moscow Steel Institute as having said: "It appears to me that so far our [Czechoslovak-Soviet] exchange of experiences has been somewhat one-sided. You [Czechoslovaks] have adopted our experiences but you have given us few of yours. Czechoslovak students come to our colleges and our professors go to lecture in your country. It is necessary that Soviet students study in your country and that your professors come to lecture at Soviet universities. You, too, have many things to convey to us."

In conclusion Vojtech cautioned that Czechoslovaks must not imagine that they were so superior that there was nothing to be learned from the USSR, but in the main his broadcast implied that the great Soviet motherland had much to learn from Czechoslovak culture and industrial technique.

1955 Plan Fulfillment

At a December 9 government conference, Premier Viliam Siroky, speaking about the 1955 plan fulfillment, declared that the pace of industrial development had been accelerated considerably during the year: "If in 1954 we increased the volume of industrial production by only 4.4 percent, this year the increase will amount roughly to ten percent. . . . The absolute growth in industrial production this year will be higher than during the years of the first Five Year Plan."

Siroky also referred to the elimination of disproportions in the national economy and the "justness" of the government's refusal to declare a slowdown in the overall pace of industrial development:


"Some economists tried to prove that elimination of disproportions . . . in individual branches . . . could be achieved only at the price of an overall slowdown in the pace of developing the national economy. On the other hand, the Party, starting from the requirement of the uninterrupted growth of production . . . has always emphasized that disproportions . . . must be remedied during the forward march. Today, at the end of 1955, we see that this directive was absolutely correct. It has been confirmed that liquidation of disproportions . . . works towards speeding up the overall pace. And it cannot be otherwise. The development of the economy can be continuous only if it takes place proportionally."

On December 14, Radio Prague broadcast a report of a National Assembly Budget and Economic Committee meeting at which Chairman of the State Planning Office Otakar Simunek discussed 1955 gains and existing "disproportions." Simunek said that in comparison with 1954, gross industrial production in 1955 had increased ten percent, agriculture production 9.4 percent, foreign trade 13 percent, and retail trade in the first ten months of 1955 8.2 percent. Simunek pointed out, however, that plan targets in capital investment, engineering and hard coal mining had not been reached, and that the development of light industry was proceeding too fast in comparison with development of capital goods production. "As far as industrial production as a whole is concerned," he said, "it will be necessary to extend considerably the fuel and power base. In the agricultural sector, increased attention must be paid to higher fodder production." In the debate which followed Simunek's speech, government officials discussed lags in the building industry, and plans to increase the number of women workers to alleviate manpower shortages. It was also recommended that Czechoslovak exports be more widely advertised.

Romania

Repatriation

The formation of a Romanian Repatriation Committee with the task of "helping all those beyond the borders of our country to understand correctly the situation in which they are and to release them from the influence of hostile propaganda," was announced by *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), December 11. The goals of the new organization cor-



"Boss, Ivan is lousing up his work again!"

"Excellent. I was just wondering whom to criticize at the union meeting."

Trud (Sofia), December 3, 1955

respond to those of similar committees recently established elsewhere in the orbit: to help emigres "overcome their doubts and fears . . . to tell them the truth about our country . . . and to combat lies [spread] by certain circles interested in preventing repatriation." Exploiting national and family sentiments and painting a sordid picture of the "miserable and humiliating" living conditions of Romanian emigres in the West, the Committee drafted an appeal urging refugees to "put an end to their loneliness" and to return home, where they could find "mental peace alongside their parents, wives and children," and could contribute to "the Romanian People's constructive work." Headquarters of the Committee have been set up in Berlin; a Committee broadcasting station, "Voice of the Homeland," is already in operation, and a Committee newspaper will be published under the same name.

The Chairman of the new Committee was described as "worker" Constantin Agiu. In actual fact he was Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the period 1947-1949. The Secretary is Nicolae Popescu-Doreanu, who had been Minister of Education in 1950-52. Other members of the Committee include several men who returned from West Germany, a journalist deported from France, Ionel Pop, former official in the Peasant Party, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1945-47) Gheorghe Tatarescu, who was recently released from five years imprisonment without a trial.

Several days after the establishment of the new Committee, Socialist Titel Petrescu (Vice-Premier in 1944), also recently released from prison, sent a letter to *Scinteia* (Bucharest) in which he praised the industrial achievements of the Communist regime, urged Socialists abroad to return home and declared that he had formerly "underestimated" the "depth of the changes" which had taken place in the country. Dated December 18, the letter read as follows:

"Today I am in a position to admit what has become evident—that the policy of the Romanian Workers' Party is just . . . Some of my political friends—and here I am thinking particularly of those abroad—will be astonished by my new attitude [towards] the regime . . . of the Romanian People's Republic. But I think that what is astonishing is not my stand, which is natural for a Socialist who realizes what changes have been made; what is truly astonishing are the Socialist achievements in Romania today. This is the true and only explanation of the attitude which I have adopted and which I will follow from now on . . .

" . . . My friends abroad . . . are perhaps expecting other messages from me. I ask them to understand that in our country the people are building a new society without us. I think it is their duty to return home, to [ally] themselves with the Romanian people in their fight . . . for a new life in Romania. . . . Today, when all the peoples of the world are fervently wishing for peace, we Socialists cannot but be on their side. In our age, the war desired by those who see in it a means . . . of reviving the past, would be devastating . . . due to the atomic and hydrogen weapons of destruction. We Socialists cannot support such an inhuman policy. I hope that these few words of mine, coming from a sincere desire for good, may reach the hearts and minds of my friends abroad [and result] in the wise deed I am expecting from them."

Although Petrescu is not officially a member of the repatriation committee, his collaboration, as well as that of other former opposition leaders, has obviously been gained under pressure. By using Petrescu, the leading Socialist, Ionel Pop, former official in the National Peasant Party, and prewar Liberal Party Premier Tatarescu, the regime is not only attempting to woo exiles from abroad but to gain the cooperation of people at home.

Ministerial Reorganization

Radio Bucharest, January 7, announced that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had been reorganized into three separate ministries for agriculture, forestry and State farms. Former head of the combined Ministry, Constantin Popescu, was named the new Minister of Forestry; Gheorghe Hossu, until now Minister of Construction and former director of the Danube-Black Sea Canal works, was named Minister of Agriculture; and Bucur Schiopu, Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission, became the new Minister for State Farms.

On January 9, Radio Bucharest announced changes in the Ministry of Timber, Paper and Cellulose, which was reorganized into a Ministry of Timber with Mihai Suder remaining as chief. Radio Bucharest also disclosed that engineer Stefan Balan had been named the new Minister of Construction.

In April 1951, the Ministry of Forestry, Wood and Cellulose was divided into a Ministry of Timber, Paper and Cellulose and a Ministry of Forestry; in July 1952, the Ministry of Agriculture was divided into a Ministry of Agriculture and a Ministry of State Farms; and in November 1953, the Ministries of Agriculture, State Farms and Forestry were combined into a Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. These changes, as well as the latest reorganiza-

tion, were probably intended to help remedy persistent farm shortcomings, and were indicative of regime dissatisfaction with production efforts in these sectors.

Bulgaria

1956 Plan

The 1956 State economic plan, discussed and approved at a December 12-14 National Assembly session, calls for substantial production increases in some sectors of heavy industry, chiefly those producing means of production; in comparison with 1955, however, the planned rate of overall development in heavy industry and agriculture is lower, while that for the light and food industries is higher.

Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), December 15, announced the following planned percentage increases over 1955 plans in industrial production (1955 planned increases over 1954 plans in parentheses): overall industrial production, 11.9 (7.3); electrification, 15.2 (10.9); heavy industry, 6.7 (13); light and food industry, 13.8 (6.3); industrial enterprises under the agricultural ministry, 34.2 (39.7); "Gorubso" for lead and zinc mining, 10.5 (4.1). Production of electric energy is to increase 12.6 (15.5); coal, 13.4 (15.7); rolled metals, 54.1 (84.1); cement, 6.8 (10.8); cotton fabrics, 4.3 (6).

Overall farm production is supposed to increase 17.8 percent (21.7), which includes an 8.4 percent (7) rise in live-stock breeding. Mechanization of farm work is scheduled to increase about 17 percent on collectives and State farms, and an additional area of 44,000 hectares is to be brought under cultivation. In 1956 labor productivity is supposed to rise sharply over 1955; in industry 7.7 percent (3.3); in the building industry 7.8 (1.3); in retail trade 6.3 (3.2); and in transportation 3.3 (0.6). Production costs in industry are scheduled to decrease by 4.3 (3.3) and on State farms by 10 (18.3).

The 1956 plan provides for expansion of hydroelectric and thermoelectric power stations, coal pits, the Stalin Chemical Combine and the lead and zinc plant now under construction. As for goods sold to the population, the plan envisages the following percentage increases in trade turnover: rice, 9.5; beans, 8; fresh vegetables, 18; meat, 10.3; vegetable oil and animal fat, 6.8; sugar, 8.6; sugar products, 6.1; milk, 16.1; eggs, 4.2; cotton fabrics, 16.7; woolen fabrics, 17.6; radio sets, 16.5; metal household utensils, 11.8; metal bedsteads, 63.6.

For the first time the regime has released absolute figures on investments. In 1956, the total volume of capital investments will be 5,454,434,800 *leva*, which includes a "government reserve of 100 million *leva*." The distribution of investments is as follows: 2.8 billion *leva* for industry, which includes 540 million for coal mining, 158.5 million for ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, 264 million for the light and food industry, and 445.5 million for geological and research work. The total investment set aside for agriculture is 909,948,300 *leva*, with an additional 270 million *leva* allotted as credits for investments in collective farms. A total of 483,674,000 *leva* has been set aside for trans-

portation and communications and 866,634,000 *leva* have been allocated for cultural purposes.

In a speech to the National Assembly, Vice-Premier Chankov (Radio Sofia, December 14) described 1956 investments as follows:

"It should be noted that for 1956 capital investments will be smaller than they were this year. This has the purpose of ensuring greater possibilities in 1956 for raising the material and cultural level of the working class. Despite the decrease in the total amount of capital investments, the amounts for developing basic branches of the national economy during 1956 are not smaller than the amounts which will have been spent this year [1955]."

According to Chankov, the 1956 plan reflects the "Marxist-Leninist policy . . . of priority development of branches producing means of production." Chankov said that in view of 1956 planned increases, industry will be enlarged by more than 67 percent and the consumer goods industry by more than 37 percent over 1952. He also said that in 1956 Bulgarian industry will start production of new items, such as motorcycles, bicycles and combines for corn harvesting. "These products," Chankov said, "must not be inefficient or of old construction. . . . The building of Socialism has to be based on the latest technical developments and methods."

At the end of 1956, Chankov said, electric power production will reach at least 2.3 billion kwh, nine times the 1939 level, and the population will receive 15 percent more electric current. Coal production will increase by 1,364,000 tons over 1955, with the population receiving 16 percent more coal than it did during 1955. Aside from the speedy development of heavy industry, Chankov added, the "draft plan provides for a further increase in production of the light and food industry. A rise of 23 percent is planned in the food industry, in the textile industry about seven percent, in the rubber industry more than 10 percent, and in the glass, china and pottery industries more than 18 percent." Chankov described the increased targets for 1956 as being entirely realistic. "They are based," he said, "on our achievements in recent years. . . . It is necessary to exploit the labor know-how accumulated in recent years, to put into motion all reserves of the national economy, to reduce production costs and to increase labor productivity—main pillars of the road towards continued construction of Socialism and the satisfaction of the [people's] ever-increasing needs."

Relations with Greece

Attempts to normalize relations with Greece were intensified at the end of the year with a December 15, 1955, Bulgarian note to the Greek government claiming that the interests of both countries required an atmosphere of mutual confidence and security. The note, broadcast over Radio Sofia, December 30, also insisted that the Bulgarian regime does not intend to impose its political and economic system on any country and had only friendly intentions towards Greece. Suggestions were made for resumption of railroad, telephone and telegraph communications and broader cul-

tural relations. The Bulgarian government also expressed its readiness to pay in kind part of its \$45 million reparations debt to Greece.

Premier Chervenkov turned to the subject of Bulgarian-Greek relations in his New Year's message broadcast over Radio Sofia, December 31. Reiterating the themes of the December 15 note, Chervenkov said:

"... We have common interests, despite the fact that our social and political systems are different. . . : We are both interested in mutual trade based on the principle of mutual advantage. We are both interested in non-interference in our internal affairs. . . . We are unwilling to impose our regime on anyone. . . . Our government is willing to negotiate with the Greek Government on all disputed questions, including the reparations question. . . . We have not yet received the Greek Government's reply. I am inclined to believe that this reply will not be delayed and that it will show the Greek Government's understanding in the matter."

Although Bulgaria and Greece resumed diplomatic relations on May 22, 1954, after a break of about thirteen years, and signed trade and border agreements in the post-Stalin period, negotiations between the two countries came to a standstill over the question of reparations. Bulgaria claimed that Greece had an old, unsettled debt with Bulgaria which should be taken into account in the payment of reparations. Greece refused to recognize the debt. The latest overtures may indicate that the Bulgarian regime has reconsidered its position; since September 1953, it has been endeavoring to destroy the Balkan Pact and to neutralize the positions of Greece and Turkey. With general elections scheduled in Greece for some time in February, it is also possible that Chervenkov's latest friendship gestures are aimed at influencing Greek public opinion.

Youth Conference

At the fifth plenum of the Central Committee of DUPY (Communist youth union) which opened in Sofia on November 28, plans were made for improving the work of youth in rural areas. In a resolution published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), December 3, 1955, the Central Committee stated that DUPY's main weakness was failure to induce youth to take an active part in the solution of rural economic problems: "The participation of rural youth in practical work for obtaining higher yields is the most important factor in the Communist education of youth." DUPY rural organizations were assigned the following tasks:

"Rural youth and pioneers must actively participate in collection, transportation and utilization of local fertilizers . . . so that in 1956 no less than 12 million tons of local fertilizer will have been transported. . . . By the end of 1955 and during 1956, [they] must plant at least 600,000 mulberry trees. . . . Another 5,000 young people must be sent to collectives and State farms to do stockbreeding work in 1956. DUPY organizations are obliged to help pick this year's cotton crop. One of the most important and constant objectives of DUPY organizations is to demonstrate



"He had a heart attack. It was the first time since he's been director that they didn't change the production plan."

Dikobraz (Prague), December 8, 1955

the advantages of collective farming. For this purpose all forms of agitation and political work should be employed."

Although Premier Vulko Chervenkov delivered a speech to the plenum on November 28, the text of his address was not published in the press until December 22. When it appeared in *Rabotnichesko Delo* it contained references to some differences of opinion that arose at the plenum on the question of DUPY's tasks. Chervenkov stated: "Some comrades spoke here . . . about the real task of the people's youth, which in reality means something else. By the term 'real tasks' they apparently mean some kind of educational activity, something like a sermon, unconnected with physical work. This seems like some . . . kind of retreat from the real tasks of the Union. . . . Communist education cannot be separated from fulfillment of production plans. . . . The education of youth consists in the struggle for fulfillment of practical tasks."

In concluding his speech Chervenkov urged DUPY to take an active role in proving the advantages of collective farming. "The time is not far off," he said, "when collectivization of our rural economy will be completed. We cannot sit on two chairs for too long." In view of the emphasis on DUPY's practical farm work, however, it seems that the Party's main concern at present is increasing the farm yield.

Poland

"Socialist Legality"

In moves to "strengthen Socialist legality," the regime recently tried a group of former officials in the Ministry of Public Security and announced completion of the draft of a new penal code. This code, which will supplant a 1932 code amended by the Communists in 1945-47, allegedly re-

duces the number of crimes for which the sentence of capital punishment can be given. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 20, the death penalty will be applied only in exceptional cases and for the "most heinous crimes." The number of life sentences handed down by the courts will also be reduced and a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment will generally prevail. Jerzy Sawicki, who outlined the new penal code, explained the reason for this latter provision in an interview over Radio Warsaw, December 20: "We consider no one," he said, "an incorrigible offender who must be locked up for life."


Sawicki also stated that the new code takes into consideration the fact that ordinary crimes and "acts undermining State security" have decreased, whereas thefts of national property and "acts harming consumer interests" have increased. The code therefore calls for stricter punishment of thieves of national property and of speculators. It also provides for harsh punishment of hooligans because juvenile delinquency has become a major problem.

Other important features of the new code include provisions for internal deportation and the introduction of "corrective labor without imprisonment." Based on Soviet penal law, this latter provision means that persons convicted of certain minor crimes will continue to work as before, but about 10-25 percent of their wages will be deducted and paid to the State Treasury.

In the autumn of 1955, the press published a number of complaints about the existing penal system. These involved criticism of the unjust fines and penalties inflicted on "kulaks" and condemnation of the large-scale imprisonment of farmers—a policy which was described as hampering farm work and lacking beneficial results. On October 22, *Slowo Powszechne* (Warsaw) accused the judiciary of "being too concerned with political matters and with punishing kulaks." As a result, the newspaper claimed, imprisonment was no longer considered a degrading punishment. *Slowo Powszechne* also said that too little attention was paid to common crimes and murders, even though the courts handed down prison sentences too easily. From the slight information available, it would appear that the new code attempts to remedy some of these "faults." Sawicki's statement that "crimes against public security" had diminished is in line with the regime's present campaign to prevent abuses by Security officials and to gain the confidence of the population.

Radio Warsaw, December 23, reported the trial *in camera* of Jozef Rozanski, former chief investigator of the Ministry of Public Security. Rozanski was sentenced to five years in jail on charges of "abusing his authority by using methods of investigation prohibited by law." He was also accused of tolerating similar abuses by his subordinates. On January 7, Radio Warsaw announced that five other former employees of the Security Police had been sentenced to 2-9 years of imprisonment for using "illegal inquiry methods."

Rozanski, one of the prominent figures in the Swiatlo revelations, was arrested in January 1955 in a purge affecting top officials of the Ministry of Public Security, which had been reorganized in December 1954 and renamed the



"Well, one more meeting and two more conferences and we'll be done with fall harvesting."

Sturshel (Sofia), October 7, 1955.

Ministry of Internal Affairs. The reorganization marked the beginning of a letup in police pressure and of a discernible thaw in various sectors of Polish national life.

Plan Results

First Deputy Premier Hilary Minc made a December 23 speech to the Party Central Committee in which he discussed "preliminary results" of the Six Year Plan (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 1). Minc stated that in terms of value the industrial production plan had been overfulfilled by nine percent, and that an increase of 181 percent had been achieved over 1949 production instead of the scheduled 158. Minc pointed out, however, that although the Plan was overfulfilled for both heavy and light industry, "not all branches of industry" met plan targets. Discussing specific achievements, he said that coal production had reached 94.5 million tons annually, electric power production 17.6 million kwh, and steel production 4.45 million tons. Production of agricultural machines and tools increased tenfold over prewar production, and production of textiles, sugar and paper twofold, he claimed. Minc added that efforts had been made to develop the armament industry and that Poland was now producing tanks, artillery, jet planes and radar equipment. The Six Year Plan also resulted in the creation of new industries making automobiles, tractors, lathes, ships and planes.

While the plan for industrial production was overfulfilled, Minc said that the Six Year Plan for agriculture had failed, and that instead of the intended 50 percent rise in production, only a 19 percent increase had been achieved. Nevertheless, he said, farm production was eight percent higher than before the war. Pointing out reasons for underfulfillment of the Plan, Minc said that targets were un-

realistic, the production of farm machines and chemicals insufficient, and the planned rate of collectivization too rapid. He also referred to mistakes in farm policy: "It was possible to achieve more. . . . It was possible to achieve more by application of economic incentives in agriculture. . . . It was possible to achieve more by swift and energetic curbs on violations of legality. . . . It was possible to achieve more by better adjustment of the tax and delivery system to local conditions." While indicating that the program in the countryside had been too harsh and deploring the disproportionate development of agriculture and industry, Minc said that the priority given to industrial development must be maintained: "Slowdown in the tempo of industrial development, in order to [eliminate the lag] in agriculture would be incorrect."

Minc also reported on lags in the living standard, stating that instead of a planned 40 percent increase in real wages, only a 26-27 percent rise had been attained. He blamed this on low farm production and the need to devote billions of *zlotys* to modernization of armaments and the development of defense industries. He also attributed the insufficient rise in the living standard to various mistakes, such as poor utilization of reserves, inadequate technical progress and lack of managerial initiative. Minc said that the wages of miners, foundry workers and workers in the construction and tool industries had increased considerably, but that those of workers in non-productive (non-industrial) fields had showed no significant changes. Minc said that the increase of the peasants' living standard had been more evenly distributed than that of the workers' living standard, but on the whole he defended the policy of giving higher pay to workers in key industries, particularly coalminers. In conclusion, Minc said that the new Five Year Plan foresees further industrialization and "great strides in the building of Socialism in the countryside. . . . The great class struggle . . . to build Socialism in the countryside is still before us. In this field, we have made only a beginning."

Steel Conference

At a national conference of steel workers in Stalinogrod, December 11-12, Minister of Metallurgy Kiejstut Zemajtis discussed past achievements in the industry and future goals. Zemajtis stated (Radio Warsaw, December 11) that 1955 steel production had reached 4,450,000 tons as compared with the nation's 1938 steel production of 1,440,000 tons. In the past ten years, he said, 27 new Martin furnaces and six electrical furnaces had been built, and the first stage of building had been completed on the major Six Year Plan project, Nowa Huta, now producing 330,000 tons of steel annually. By 1960, Nowa Huta is expected to produce 1,700,000 tons and overall steel production is to reach seven million tons. This increase is to be achieved mainly by enlarging and modernizing existing facilities. The major building task will be expansion of Nowa Huta and construction of a new foundry for quality steel near Warsaw. Attention will also be paid to extending the raw material base, and construction of new iron ore mines has been scheduled in the Leczyca district.

First Deputy Premier Hilary Minc also addressed the conference (Radio Warsaw, December 14) and stated that the Six Year Plan as a whole had been overfulfilled and planned targets reached. Minc said that the new Five Year Plan is similar to the Six Year Plan in that its basic aim is further industrialization. The new plan, however, will start from a "different, considerably higher production and technical base, both with regard to quality and quantity." The major difference between the two plans is that while the Six Year Plan concentrated primarily on creating new industries, the Five Year Plan is focussed on bringing existing industries up to their full production capacity:

"... In the Six Year Plan we had to concentrate our efforts on the creation of new branches of industry, on building from scratch great industrial enterprises in new localities, on supplying industry with manpower through the [transfer] of millions of people from villages to towns. It is obvious that during the Five Year Plan we shall continue to invest and build, for without this there is no expanded Socialist production, but the main accent in the plan is not on building new enterprises but on full modernization of the old ones, on bringing enterprises under construction up to the planned production capacity. Moreover, the chief accent of the plan will not be increase of manpower but the stabilization of this manpower, or its relatively slight increase, and a considerable rise in the level of qualifications. The plan will lay main stress on the utilization of reserves, and technical progress, which means a rise in production with the lowest possible investments, highest quality, and lowest possible production costs."

Calling the planned steel production goal of seven million tons "reasonable," Minc claimed that immense reserves exist in the industry and that the "basic plan for development of the industry" is "rightly based on utilization of reserves and maximum technical progress." Minc said that while the steel industry has now reached a production level of 175 kg. per capita, Czechoslovakia had reached a level of 340 kg. and France 300: "That is why there is no reason for carefree boasting. We must realize that further important tasks confront us—a considerable rise in steel production."

Price Revisions

On January 1, the prices of various raw materials, machinery and equipment used by Polish factories in the nationalized and cooperative sector were increased. According to Radio Warsaw, December 17, this price revision was motivated by the fact that Polish industrial plants were operating at a loss and had to be subsidized by the State: "The present prices have resulted in unprofitable output at enterprises producing means of production. . . . After fixing prices so that they correspond to production costs, our enterprises will be able to work on the principle of profitability, and consequently will not have to receive State subsidies." Radio Warsaw denied rumors that the new, increased prices of capital goods would have the effect of increasing retail prices of goods purchased by the people.

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw) of the same date gave further reasons for the increased prices. The newspaper claimed

that the cost of producing one ton of coal was 70 percent higher than the price paid by purchasers, and that numerous other price discrepancies existed. One kilo of calf hide, for instance, sold at 5 *zlotys*, whereas one kilo of much less valuable pigskin sold for as high as 17 *zlotys*. These discrepancies, *Trybuna Ludu* said, stemmed from the January 3, 1953 revision of wages and prices, when the balance between costs and prices was distorted: "The prices of producer goods were unchanged, while production costs, due to wage increases, rose."

Albania

Plan Fulfillment

In a December 30, 1955 broadcast, Radio Tirana announced that the 1955 plan had been fulfilled by almost 100 percent, and that total industrial production had risen 13 percent over 1954. In specific industries, the alleged percentage increases were as follows: coal, 30; naphtha, 12; copper, 44; chrome, 25; asphalt, 34; electric power, 35; building materials, 54; machines, 5; light industry, 3; and the food industry, 4. Building increased 28.7 percent over 1954, and trade turnover 7 percent. Radio Tirana said that the agricultural plan had also been fulfilled satisfactorily, with the exception of cotton and olive production. "The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party is convinced that political, social and economic conditions in the country have reached maturity and that they will be instrumental in the more rapid collectivization of agriculture." Figures on collectivization were provided by Radio Tirana, January 2, in an announcement that the Ministry of Agriculture "had approved the creation of 12 new collective farms, 11 in the district of Korca and one in the Shkodra district." The announcer stated that there is now a total of 318 collectives in Albania, 168 of which were formed in 1955.

The 1956 plan, as announced by Radio Tirana, December 30, provides for an 11 percent rise in the volume of industrial production, which represents a slight reduction over the 1954-55 rate of development. Production of means of production is to increase 16 percent and of consumer goods 8 percent. "Production of industry and mines will be . . . 14 percent higher than the amount estimated for 1955." The Radio Tirana broadcast also revealed that trade turnover is to increase another 7 percent in 1956 and that 3.6 billion *leks* would be "invested for economic and cultural development," and 2.15 billion *leks* for building.

On the same day, Radio Tirana also announced that the Third Congress of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party would be convened on May 25.

Happy New Year

"The time at which some central Warsaw offices and institutions start work has been changed at the request of the employees and with the agreement of the competent authorities. In most cases the time for starting work has been shifted to an earlier hour."

Radio Warsaw, January 4, 1956.

Rationing

On January 2, Radio Tirana announced that, "on the basis of successes achieved," the Party Central Committee had decided on the partial abolition of rationing and the standardization of retail prices. It was stated that, as of January 3, ration books would no longer be required for cotton and woolen items, shoes, sandals, knitwear and socks. The regime fixed the new retail prices of those goods by establishing new, higher prices in State stores corresponding to a 10-48 percent reduction of their previous cost on the free market. The Central Committee also decreed that the Council of Ministers would set up a "compensation system" for State and cooperative workers, who would get discounts on purchases of clothing and footwear in view of the new, higher prices. "Workers with lower pay will receive higher compensation, and those with higher pay lower compensation." Rationing still exists for food and other consumer goods.

The Party Central Committee also announced a new system of rural trade based on uniform prices and contractual agreements. To encourage production of industrial crops, the Central Committee decreed that producers of these crops would be allowed a ten percent discount on the State prices of industrial articles. Sugar beet producers can now buy sugar products at a ten percent discount to the amount of half their deliveries to the State. Similarly, cotton producers are entitled to buy calico, cloth and woolen fabrics at a ten percent discount on the basis of 40 percent of their State deliveries. The same discount applies to tobacco producers purchasing woolen fabrics and yarn. All growers of industrial crops will receive a ten percent discount on purchases of fertilizer. "Peasants who deliver industrial crops, grain, olive oil, butter and beans to State enterprises and cooperatives must be given precedence in the supply of industrial articles which are most essential to the peasantry."

Recent and Related

The Language of Communism, by Harry Hodgkinson (*Pitman Publishing Corp.*: \$3.75). Published originally in England under the title of "Doubletalk," this book forms a sort of brief dictionary attempting to unravel the turns and twists of Soviet propaganda jargon, and emphasizing the effects the Communists intend to produce by the use (or misuse) of words. The author points out technical distinctions indicating Communist concepts and value systems, as in the social hierarchy of "workers," "working class," "class conscious workers" and "proletariat." He discusses the problem of translation from English into Russian and how some Russian translations reveal political and cultural orientations of the Soviet mind. There are brief accounts of changes in word meanings. The vocabulary ranges from Soviet interpretations of the terms "peace," "co-existence," and "internationalism" to "existentialism," "music," and "women". Included also are notes on the author's sources and a few cartoons from Soviet publications.

The History of a Soviet Collective Farm, by Fedor Belov (*Praeger*: \$5.50). This unusual study was written by a Ukrainian who served as chairman of a collective farm in the Carpathians for nearly three years. Recalled to the Army in 1949 and stationed in Germany, his progressive disillusionment provoked his escape, in 1951, to Western Germany. The book is a detailed study, beginning with the history of the village to 1947, and continuing with such chapter headings as "The Structure of the Kolkhoz," "Field Work and Crop Deliveries," "The Development of Animal Husbandry on the Kolkhoz," "The Planning and Organization of Operations," "Labor, Equipment and Draft Power," "Rural Housing Construction and Electrification," and "Individual Households." Appendices, tables and index.

Soviet Espionage, by David J. Dallin (*Yale*: \$5.75). The first of a projected two volume work which attempts a serious, objective and accurate study of Soviet espionage methods, efficiency and defects. The present volume is devoted to the gathering of secret information on foreign affairs, and the second will deal with espionage directed against anti-Communist movements abroad, deviators

and defectors, and the recruiting of spies among Russian emigres. The book discusses the main prewar and wartime objectives of Soviet espionage in France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland, and postwar activities. According to the author, the dual nature of Soviet intelligence, as both an arm of foreign and military policy and part of the international Communist movement, distinguishes it from the intelligence systems of other nations. The fusing of these two functions, resulting in a channeling of information to the Soviet Union from the Communist undergrounds throughout the world, was due to the Stalinist tenet of "priority of Soviet Russian interests and subordination of personalities and parties to the needs of the Soviet Union," an approach alien to Lenin and Trotsky. Mr. Dallin states that his sources have been carefully checked and information of "doubtful veracity" has been so designated or eliminated. Notes and index.

The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955 (*U.S. Department of State*: \$1.00). A record of the Geneva conference including all the proposals of the four delegations and the statements of the Foreign Ministers which were issued as conference papers. The pamphlet also contains a list of participants, a table of documents, and Secretary Dulles' November eighteenth radio and television report on the conference.

The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning, by Harry Bayard Price (*Cornell*: \$5.00). This volume is an ECA-requested condensed history and critical evaluation of the Marshall Plan and associated Asiatic programs, as actually administered. Mr. Price was selected by the Governmental Affairs Institute, a private research organization, to prepare such an independent, objective study. Roughly half of the book is devoted to an evaluation of the program—its organization, goals, techniques, productivity and progress. To Mr. Price, the Marshall Plan is "the most telling single effort of the postwar years in behalf of a stable, advancing free world system." He regrets, however, that the initial support and impetus was not adequately sustained during the four years studied by him, and deplors the

consequent "blurring" of the overall picture. He decries also the lack of long-range planning and more clearly defined goals which would "establish a sound balance between the American and European economies . . . and ensure the effective functioning of a more closely integrated Atlantic community," and warns that "if continuity is impaired by sudden changes of emphasis and direction, gains achieved at heavy cost may be sacrificed." Index.

Adam Mickiewicz, (*UNESCO*: \$3.00). UNESCO has published this volume in commemoration of the centenary of the death of the great Polish poet, Mickiewicz. It contains a brief sketch of the life of this artist and fighter for freedom and a series of essays on his work and influence by critics and scholars. Also included are tributes by Alexander Pushkin, Charles de Montalembert, Jules Michelet, George Sand and Ernest Renan, contemporaries of Mickiewicz, as well as selections from his poetry and prose and a listing of the principal translations of his works in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. Illustrations.

The Fifteen Weeks, by Joseph M. Jones (*Viking*: \$3.75). During the fifteen weeks between the day in February, 1947 when Britain informed the U.S. State Department that she could no longer help Greece and Turkey, and the day in June when the Marshall Plan was launched in a speech at Harvard, what Mr. Jones calls a "national conversion" occurred. A member of the State Department staff during this period, he saw first a few men—Truman, Acheson, Marshall—and then the Congress and the American people rise above narrow and traditional concepts of foreign policy. "Most men," says Mr. Jones, "are prisoners of their own limited conception of what is possible." In this instance, he feels, the President and the Secretary of State showed the imagination and leadership to "open new vistas of what is necessary and what is possible. . . ." The book covers the background, personalities and public reactions to and consequences of the Marshall Plan's formulation, and includes in an appendix the major addresses of its three prime movers. Index.



THE FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE was founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens who joined together for direct action aimed at the eventual liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries. With the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee has set up, among other activities, Radio Free Europe and Free Europe Press. The Committee's efforts are focused on the captive countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these efforts the Committee counts among its active allies the democratic leaders—scholars, journalists, political and economic experts, and men of letters—who have escaped from the Communist enslavement of their native lands.

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